

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background to the Study

With an estimated population of over 120 million, Nigeria is Africa's largest country in terms of demographic size. With a GDP of US\$415 billion, it is the largest economy in Africa. Nigeria holds the record for being the largest oil producer on the continent and the sixth in OPEC. The country is well endowed with petroleum, gas and yet-untapped mineral resources. Its agricultural potentials are considerable, although the country remains a net importer of food. Over the last decade growth has averaged 7.4% and is projected to be 6.9% by year's end 2012.¹

Nigeria remains a paradox, if not an enigma, to many observers. A country of energetic and highly entrepreneurial peoples and with an embarrassment of natural riches, the bulk of the population remain impoverished. Although per capita income has improved in recent years to about US\$2,500 (in PPP terms), more than 60% of the people live below the poverty line while income inequalities are also widening, with an estimated gain coefficient of 43.7 percent. Unemployment stands at a national average of 24%, with an estimated 54% of the youth population without jobs. A recent World Bank study depicts the country's development trajectory in terms of unemployment growth. Massive revenues from oil earnings have gone into consumption and recurrent expenditure, with little left to finance the yawning gaps in physical infrastructures. Corruption is widespread in public life while capital flight is an endemic feature of the political economy. As a result, the vast majority have no access to electricity, water and

¹ Olugbenga Ashiru- Nigeria Foreign Policy and the new realities in the changing world. ThisdayLive Publishd April 16. Retrived June 7 2014| <http://www.thisdaylive.com/> Nigeria's Foreign Policy: New Realities In A Changing World, Articles

basic social services. Life-expectancy stands at 51 years, which is well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa.²

Nigeria's internal security has been significantly undermined by violent activities of armed non-state actors, largely made up of radicalised youth groups as foot soldiers. Prominent among these groups are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the O'Odun People's Congress (OPC), the Arewa People's Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, 'Kala-Kato', and Ombatse, among others.³

Apart from the challenges of poverty, sectarian, economic and political crises, and Niger Delta Militancy, Nigeria is currently facing a deeper and profound challenge of terrorism, especially in the North-Eastern region of the country. In the past two years, we have witnessed the vulnerability of the Nigerian state to terror, criminality and instability. The list of these disheartening phenomena includes, but is not limited to the bombing of several Churches, Mosques, Police Stations, Schools and Prisons in Bauchi, Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa states. Other parts of the country were not spared, as the sect-bombing activities were witnessed in the Federal capital territory, Abuja, Plateau, Kaduna and Kano states. The bombing of the United Nations office in Abuja is perhaps what the insurgents used to gain global recognition; as they are now listed amongst terrorist organizations by the United States and its allies, (for more details see *The Economist*, September 3, 2011).⁴

² "Rethinking Boko Haram Activities: The Role of Bad Governance in its Occurrence" *International Journal of History and Strategic Studies*, 2(1), 51-52

³ Johnson Toni, "Backgrounder: Boko Haram" Council on Foreign Relations", available online at <http://www.cfr.org/africa/bokoharam/> p25739 accessed on 31 August 2014

⁴ *The Economist* September 2011 Edition pg 32

Available statistics on the number of deaths and property lost to Boko Haram insurgency between 2002 and 2013 to say the least is highly controversial. Our interviewee accounts claim that over 10,000 people (including women and children) have been killed and property worth over 100 million dollars have been destroyed during the period under discussion (culled from interview of victims of Boko Haram attacks in Abuja, North Central, North East and North West regions of the country). However, official reports put the death toll at 8,000 plus and property destroyed at 40 million dollars (culled from the interview of government officials in Abuja, Yobe, Kaduna, Plateau and Adamawa states).

The emergence of the Boko Haram has caused the climate of fear and insecurity. Although the movement had incubated in Northern Nigeria since the early 2000s, it however attracted worldwide attention beginning from 26 July 2009, when it waged a violent anti-government uprising that killed over 800 people, including civilians, group's members, and security personnel. The revolt attracted one of the heaviest security crackdowns in Nigerian history. The five-day revolt ended on 30 July when Boko Haram's charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was captured and subsequently executed by the police while in their custody.

Since July 2009 Nigeria fledging democracy has struggled to contain the terrorism of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati (Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet Teachings and Jihad; commonly called Boko Haram). The group avowed aim is to rid the country of its corrupt leaders and impose sharia law as the supreme law of the land. In the last three years, the extremist group has spearheaded more devastating attacks in Nigeria than all other groups combined. These attacks, which show evidence of increasing sophistication and geographical expansion, appear to

be increasingly targeted at Nigeria religious and ethnic fault lines in a bid to hurt the nation's stability.⁵

The world is fast changing today. Every society is now associated with one terrorist group or the other. The ugly phenomenon of terrorism became known in the world in the 1970s, especially with the 1972 Black September kidnapping of Jewish athletes during the Munich Olympic, and plane hijacking that led to the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in 1976 to free Jewish hostages. However with the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet power and other communist party regimes in the Eastern Europe, a new set of terrorism has come to be added to those old ones. Islamic fundamentalist is now being talked about as the source of the terrorist menace troubling today's world, and deliberately aimed at filling the void created by the collapse of internal communism. In Nigeria, terrorist organizations can generally be described to have been created as a result of the perceived constant marginalization of a certain group of people. Numerous of these organizations in Nigeria include Oodua People's Congress(OPC), The Anambra Vigilance Service(Bakassi Boys),Egbesu Boys of Africa,Arewa People's Congress(ACP), Operation Zaki- Zaki and Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra(MASSOB) among others. Of recent, there is the Boko Haram. The name "Boko" was derived from "Boka" or sorcerer-a character associated with shirk which is an automatic act of disbelief and the most repugnant act of Islam. With the foregoing analysis, we have established the fact that terrorism exists in Nigeria. Besides, recently, the United States of America (USA)

⁵ Cheta Nwanze- Short History of Boko Haram. Sahara Reporters | <http://saharareporters.com/2014/08/18/nigerian-government-greater-threat-its-people-boko-haram-udoka-okafor> Published March 31 2014 assessed August 2014

classified Nigeria along other countries as Yemen, Iran, Pakistan among others as terrorist countries⁶

The nature of attacks attributed to Boko Haram suggests that the group has grown rapidly in confidence, capability and coordination. In attacks in December and March Boko Haram units massed several hundred combatants in Maiduguri to attack the main air force and army bases.

The Objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy have been fairly concordant since they were first hatched after independence in October 1960. Yet the interests, priorities and emphasis of Nigeria's foreign policy does not seem to have changed in the context of the changing and dynamic domestic and international environment.⁷ This is spelt out when the issue of insurgency groups and terrorism came to the horizon of Nigeria. The authority in Nigeria seems to be relaxed when the issue of terrorism was first uncovered, although this trend is relatively new and strange in the country. The effect (collateral damage) of terrorism was only seen in foreign countries and the ability of their media to beam live footage of this development to other part of the world, is a wakeup call for countries preparedness against future strike by terrorists and this phenomenon can happen in areas that have not been known to be a terrorists operating zones. For every deadly act committed by terrorists in these countries, it enables the country to take decisive or proactive measures in stopping and reducing the vulnerability of the terrorism, the act can be repeated at a different interval. The global campaign against terrorism is the collective responsibility of peace loving and civilized nations to unite and fight terrorism; this effort is spread across continents and the readiness of countries to adopt a common ground is needed.

⁶ Ely Karmon- Boko Haram's International Reach | <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/issue/view/ISSN%202334-3745> Published 2014

⁷ Olugbenga Ashiru- Nigeria Foreign Policy and the new realities in the changing world. ThisdayLive Publishd April 16. Retrived June 7 2014 | <http://www.thisdaylive.com/> Nigeria's Foreign Policy: New Realities In A Changing World, Articles

1.2 Statement of the problem

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been battling with series of violent agitations from various geo-political zones in the country. These violent agitations which have taken terror dimensions have contributed to national security threat that is capable of disintegrating the country. Terrorists' attacks have resulted in the killings of hundreds of people and wanton destruction of property that worth billions of naira through bombings.

The unabated waves of terror attacks and series of deadly bomb blasts by the callous, devilish and demonic militant movement, Boko Haram in the Northern part of the country, have continued to heighten and exacerbate the palpable state of insecurity in the land. The incessant Bombings which have claimed many innocent lives, as well as the barbaric and unconscionable criminal abduction of over 200 Chibok School girls plus others, have continued to generate wide spread global concern, outrage and condemnation. While mass protests and advocacy campaigns have continued to be staged in all parts of Nigeria and major cities around the world, calling for the prompt rescue and safe release of the girls, many people believe that with the abominable and unthinkable abduction of these young school girls, the Boko Haram insurgents have clearly crossed the red line!

Against this gloomy backdrop, it is heartening that a coalition of countries including the United States, Britain, France, Canada, China and Israel, have lately intervened to assist Nigeria in rescuing the Chibok School girls and end the Boko Haram insurgency⁸. With the intervention

⁸ Boko Haram - Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, 112th Congress, 1st Session. (2011). Report by United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, at <http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Boko%20Haram-%20Emerging%20Threat%20to%20the%20US%20Homeland.pdf>.

and assistance of these countries, it is believed that the battle line is now drawn and a final showdown against the Boko Haram is imminent. In spite of reservations being expressed in certain quarters regarding the external support which some have described as a violation of our national pride and sovereignty?

This Study discusses the nature, origins and impact of terrorist insurgency in Nigeria. This study discusses the phenomenon of how it has been internationalized. It also discussed it not only in the context of globalisation but also on its implication on Nigeria foreign policy and the failure to devise effective policies to meet the country's daunting challenges.

The major thrust of this Study is to investigate the internationalization of insurgency groups in Nigeria with major emphasis on the activities of the dreaded militant Islamic sect, popularly known as Boko Haram and its repercussions for Nigeria's relation with other countries.

1.3 Objective of the Study

The objective of the Study this study is to:

- I. Make an assessment of the character of Nigeria foreign policy in relation to the new developments in the global arena
- II. Examine the impact of insurgency attacks on Nigeria foreign policy
- III. Investigates the various insurgency groups in Nigeria and their outlooks
- IV. Identify the extents to which Boko Haram insurgents have been internationalized
- V. Make recommendations on the way forward

1.4 Methodology

This Study will employed the qualitative research method in trying to both describe and explain the implication of the internationalization of Boko haram insurgency group on Nigeria foreign policy. It used archival/library research or documentary analysis and the content analysis of media reports. As regards to the archival research, publications of government agencies and speeches of important personalities and government officials both past and present were used. Also included were the publications by private and corporate bodies and international organizations. NewsStudys and magazines including books and journals on the subject matter were equally employed. Materials from the Nigeria institute of international affairs, Kenneth dike library were particularly invaluable.

1.5 Research questions

- What are the new trends to insurgency groups in Nigeria?
- How has Boko haram insurgency group turn activities been internationalized?
- How has Nigeria foreign policy formulators react to the turn of events?
- What are the impacts of the insurgency group activities on Nigeria foreign policy?

1.6 Scope of the study

The scope of the study will be based on the activities of insurgency groups in Nigeria especially the latest insurgent group of Boko Haram, it assesses their origin, their makeup, and the reasons for their rise and it further document all their reported activities from their inception till date. The study also analyses Nigeria foreign policy and also the implication of the insurgent group activities on the external relations of the country.

1.7 Organization of the thesis

The presentation is in five main parts. Part one addresses the introduction, issue of definition and conceptualization of terrorism as a social phenomenon. The second discusses the global context for the proliferation of terrorist violence. In the third section we analyze the incidence of ethno-sectarian conflict in Nigeria which provides the context for the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency. The fourth part discusses the economic and social consequences of terrorism. We then provide a general summary and conclusion.

1.8 Justification of the study

Events very often (if not always) such as domestic policies and actions of sovereign governments, routine exercise of power on matters which border on day –to-day governance, can snow ball into foreign policy controversies that are likely to attract global attention. When this situation arises, the issues or matters upon which governments have acted within the domestic

jurisdiction of states or governments become objects of international concern. The operation of the Boko Haram has moved from the sphere of domestic or internal politics to international domain. Albert Tanimu Sam Tsokwa, the chairman of the House of Representatives on Rules and Business realized the interconnections between the Boko Haram which started in Nigeria as a domestic issue and the external dimension of this same phenomenon especially when he was asked whether the National Assembly could intervene. In Nigeria, it is ironical that democracy, which should be the channel for reducing the problem of competition for resources, through the provision of basic facilities, has instead created a situation of poverty. Out of hopelessness, the Nigerian masses have resorted to threatening the nation's security by killing innocent citizens.

This Study considers Boko Haram as an internal crisis that has become externalized as a result of its finance and activities being linked with Al-Qaeda.

Such issues (like the case of the Boko Haram) may provoke favourable or negative reactions from other nations that are touched by policies emanating there from and this can invariably lead to the enhancement or deterioration of bilateral or multilateral relations. For instance, the state of emergency declared by President Jonathan on Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger states² have been reacted against negatively. Thus following this action by the President, the United States of America warned her nationals not to travel to such problematic areas in Nigeria. The widespread insecurity following the terrorist acts in Nigeria prompted President Jonathan wanting to boost security ties with other West African Countries. Jonathan declared thus while meeting his Niger Republic counterpart, Mahamadou Issoufou

Against the backdrop of the foregoing discussion, the Boko Haram has come to violently co-exist with the people as a consequence of the political confusion in the country that is caused by

competition among the political class. It is thus imperative to establish the international link of Boko Haram insurgency and the reaction of Nigeria foreign policy makers to find a lasting solution to the insurgency group and stop giving Nigeria a bad name.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Concept of Foreign Policy

It is precisely because states are experiencing challenges and transformations both internally and externally that the analysis of foreign policy is important. Foreign policy analysis as a distinct area of inquiry connects the study of international relations (the way states relate to each other in international politics) with the study of domestic politics (the functioning of governments and the relationships among individuals, groups, and governments). Most theories of international relations are primarily concerned with state behavior, but some include discussions of foreign policy. Theories of domestic politics, found in the study of U.S. politics and in the study of comparative politics, share this attention to internal factors. These theories tend to explain the functioning of the state or political system and the domestic policies that are chosen and rarely comment on the effects of internal politics on a state's foreign policies.

Juliet Kaarbo et.al 2012, posits that the study of foreign policy serves as a bridge by analyzing the impact of both external and internal politics on states' relations with each other. Leaders cannot forge effective foreign policies without being aware of these connections; students cannot effectively evaluate foreign policy choices without recognizing these linkages.

Logically, the existence of a "foreign policy" presupposes a distinction between inside - an actor and its domestic context - and outside/foreign - the environment the actor faces - , and some form of political relationship between the two. To set the three components of this basic, generic description of foreign policy analytically into relation, we can rely on a process-oriented

approach often adopted in classical foreign policy analysis (Clarke/White 1989; Ginsberg 2001; Smith/Webber 2002: chapt. 1-4; Smith et al. 2008).

Firstly, everything that takes place in the domestic or internal sphere has been discussed under the term “foreign policy decision-making” (Gross Stein 2008). With the intention of explaining foreign policy behaviour (Harnisch 2002), classical foreign policy analysis focused a lot on this dimension by analysing the decision-making process itself (Snyder et al. 1954; East et al. 1978) and the psychological, political and social context in which decision-makers are embedded when designing foreign policies (Sprout/Sprout 1956). In essence, the study of foreign policy decision-making requires answering each of the following questions: by whom (actors), on what basis (capacities/foreign policy instruments), for what purpose (interests/objectives) and by what means (decision-making procedures) are foreign policy decisions made?

Secondly, the view foreign policy analysts hold of the external environment depends largely on the chosen level of analysis: some approach it from an actor-based perspective, focussing - classically - on states, but also on other, non-state actors; others have taken a structure-focussed (top down) approach (cf. Carlsnaes 2008). For the analytical purposes of this Study, both (multiple sorts of) actors and structures will be considered as constituting the external sphere.

Finally, to incorporate the politics dimension into this process-based approach of foreign policy, analysts have distinguished between foreign policy decision-making and “foreign policy implementation” (Smith/Clarke 1985). Where the former depicts the phase in the foreign policy process during which decisions are prepared and taken, the latter describes how this output of the foreign policy decision-making machinery is implemented when “actors confront their environment and their environment confronts them” (Brighi/Hill 2008: 118). Here, the deeply politi-

cal core of the relationship between an actor and its environment comes to the fore. If “all politics is the exercise of influence” (Dahl/Stinebrickner 2003: 34), foreign policy as interaction between actors and their environment can be regarded as the “the exercise of influence in international relations” (Hudson/Vore 1995: 215). The foreign policy actor attempts to have an impact on its environment by employing instruments that it considers suitable for realizing its predefined objectives.

A simplified model of the foreign policy process allows us to identify the most important analytical units of foreign policy analysis. To further structure this account, and allow for a successive comparison of the assumptions IR theories, globalization and global governance make with regard to foreign policy, we derive one cluster of questions from each of the core dimensions of foreign policy:

- (1) Internal sphere: Who makes foreign policy (actors)? What type of interests/objectives are formulated and how? What are the capacities foreign policy can be built on and how can these be used (instruments)?
- (2) External sphere: Who are the actors in the external arena? What are the structures that determine how the actors typically interact?
- (3) Foreign policy implementation: How are instruments applied in order to influence the external environment? Which actors and/or which structures are the objects (or targets) of influence attempts?

In defining foreign policy, the first step in a comparative investigation of foreign policy is to define what we mean by foreign policy. This also raises issues concerning how foreign policy is studied and how it may be changing. We begin with the first term: “foreign.” We typically make the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy. “Foreign” is meant to apply to policy toward the world outside states’ territorial borders, and “domestic” is meant to apply to policy made for the internal political system. Going to war with another country, signing an international trade agreement, or aiding a rebel insurgency in another country are examples of foreign policy. Taxes, education standards, and civil rights are examples of domestic policy.

In the recent past, this distinction between foreign and domestic policy was easier to make, but contemporary politics and globalization have blurred the line between what is foreign and what is domestic. For example, the revolutionary uprising in Libya that threatened the rule of authoritarian leader Moammar Gadhafi in early 2011 began as a domestic issue. Antigovernment protestors launched a rebellion in the eastern part of Libya, and Gadhafi’s forces responded with a military crackdown. However, as reports of vicious attacks against the rebels and civilians circulated throughout the media, social networks, and blogs, western governments re-framed the civil war as a humanitarian crisis demanding international response. The United Nations Security Council voted to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a few Arab states launched airstrikes to protect civilians. By mid-2011, countries like the United States and Germany were engaged in delivery of humanitarian supplies, while Italy and France deployed military advisors to assist the rebels in the civil war. What began as a domestic uprising quickly became a foreign policy issue for Libya and many other countries in the world.

Another example of this blurring between foreign and domestic issues can be found in comparative public policy, a subject area that may seem less dramatic than war, but potentially can be equally, or more dangerous to public health. Government safety standards for food are typically aimed at the citizens of a country, but they also shape the amount and type of foods exporting countries produce. When the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an alert regarding Melamine—a chemical used in the manufacturing of food items like dairy products and even baby formula—Chinese exports to the United States were adversely affected. So, when countries make domestic policies that have the effect of changing the interactions between states, the line defining international and domestic policymaking is unclear. Today's economic interdependence means more policies have consequences inside and outside state borders.

This does not mean that there is no longer a difference between foreign and domestic policy, and a distinction can be made based on the intended target of the policy. If the primary target lies outside the country's borders, it is considered foreign policy, even if it has secondary consequences for politics inside the country. Similarly, if the primary target is inside the country, it is considered domestic policy, even if it affects others outside the country's borders. If the intention of new economic policy is to alter the trade balance with another country by placing restrictions on imports, we consider that foreign policy. Many policies, of course, have multiple targets. Ensuring clean air for a country's domestic population and limited imports from foreign automobile competitors might be equally important in the design of the environmental policy, for example. In such cases, a single policy can be both foreign and domestic. It should be clear from our discussion that the targets of foreign policy are not limited to other countries. Foreign policy may be targeted at specific individuals such as a particular leader, nonstate actors such as

international organizations, human rights groups working across borders, multinational corporations, terrorist groups, other states, the international environment, or the global economy.

Another difficulty in distinguishing foreign from domestic policy concerns the status of territorial borders. Many states' borders are in dispute. Part of a country, like the Catalan region of Spain, may be attempting to establish its independence but has only partial control in running its own affairs. Meanwhile, the rest of the country is engaged in suppression of its attempt at secession and independence. In this case, is Spain's policy toward a group seeking self-determination foreign or domestic policy? In some ways, it depends on your point of view. If you are part of the group claiming independence, as are the citizens of the region of Catalan (some 15% of Spain's population), you see the country acting across a border that you have defined and thus it is foreign policy. If you are the leader of the government of Spain, you deny this independence and see the situation as strictly an internal, domestic affair.

For such cases, we tend to rely on the judgment of the international community to distinguish foreign policy from domestic policy. If most other countries have recognized the breakaway region as independent, the relations between it and the country are perceived as foreign policy. Although in some cases it is clear what the judgment of the international community is, in others it is not. The issue of how much a country actually controls its borders is of extreme importance in states that are so weak internally that rival factions control different parts of the territory. Such "failed" countries, or countries that are sovereign only in international legal terms, have become part of the twenty-first century international landscape and raise further questions regarding the distinction between foreign and domestic policy.¹

Now that we have defined foreign, let us further clarify the term “policy.” This is a broad term, representing a whole range of activities and/or subjects. It can include specific decisions to sign a treaty on climate change, for example, and general guidelines to support initiatives to address global warming. Policy can include observable behaviors by countries, such as the Australian commitment of troops to Afghanistan, or verbal pronouncements that do not necessarily lead to follow-up action, such as Turkey’s condemnation of Israeli foreign policy toward the Palestinians. As you can see, foreign policy is not limited to military or security policy. It also includes such areas as foreign economic policy, international environmental policy, and human rights policy.

Who makes policy? The answer to this question is also an important part of the definition of “foreign policy.” Policies are typically thought of as the product of governments, and thus governments are the “actors.” Other players whose actions are intended to influence targets outside a country’s borders may also be foreign policy actors. For example, businesses may market their products in other countries. Multinational corporations are businesses that are owned by interests in various countries or divide their production across country borders. International organizations, such as the United Nations, act across borders. By traveling to foreign countries, you may be supporting their economies and interacting with foreign nationals. Although these actions are certainly “foreign,” and are an increasingly significant part of international politics, we rarely consider them “policy.” Instead, the term “policy” is typically reserved for the actions of governments, government institutions, and government officials. Hereafter, when we refer to “countries” or “states” in a discussion of foreign policy, we are referring to the governments or their officials that are acting in their name.

2.2 Framework of Analysis

- **Linkage Theory**

This Study will employ linkage theory, it will be used to identify, explore and analyze the ways in which the Boko Haram insurgency group has been internationalized and its implication on Nigeria foreign policy.

To start with, Linkage Politics stresses the interdependence of domestic and international systems. It peeps into the perennial problems relating to the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy by taking the spheres of national and international politics as interacting system. The linkage theory attempts to conceptualize relationships between variables operating within the domestic systems of states on the one hand and other variables operating in those systems environment on the other.

According to Rosenau, linkage is any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is related to in another. He further distinguish between the initial and terminal stages of a linkage by referring to the former as output and to the later as input.

Rosenau also identifies three types of linkage processes in the way in which outputs and inputs get linked together. The first he calls penetrative. This occurs when persons from the outside the state participate directly in its political process. This means that they share with those on the penetrative polity and the authority to allocate its values.

Closely linked to the penetrative is what he calls reactive. This implies that decision makers within a state takes decision in response or partly in response to behavior originating in the state's environment, but without direct participation in decision making by those whose behavior

provide the stimulus. A reactive process is the opposite of a penetrative one and is probably the most frequent form of linkage “since they arise out of the joining of both direct and indirect outputs to their corresponding inputs.

Another linkage process is the emulative process which is established when political activities in one country are perceived and emulated in another. Then, “input is not only a response to the output but takes essentially the same form as the output”. Emulative process usually link only indirect outputs and inputs.

The idea of linkages as a way of organizing data may be extended to include links from within state systems to their environment. Since international relations can be defined to but not only to inter- state actions. A growing multiplicity of actors defy the traditional judicial state. Such actors like the contracts, coalitions, non-state actors and integration across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central policy organs of government are inadequately accounted for by traditional analysis.

Bourton argues that:

The conventional map of the world is a physical one: it shows geographical relationships over which are drawn political boundaries, does not tell us much about processes and behavior... [it does] not give us much information about behavior or more particularly, about transaction and links

that exist... what we really need to have, either map form or conceptuality, is an image of world society that shows behavior by showing these linkages.

This approach underlines the fact that foreign policy of any states is invariably influenced by both the external environment and also domestic factors. This position becomes more valid when considering the new realities in the global arena and the foreign policy of most African states where internal strife and groups interests somewhat defines their standing in global politics. Indeed in the contemporary Nigeria, there is a clear instance of the dynamic relationship which the linkage theory identifies.

2.3 History and fundamentals of Nigeria foreign policy

In 1960, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was known as the Ministry of External Affairs and was established officially in September 1957 as an External Affairs Division of the Office of the then Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, with the first Minister in-charge being Dr. Jaja A. Wachukwu.

Like any other government institutions, the ministry was created and charged with the statutory responsibilities of formulation, articulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy and management of external relations. Its functions focused on 14-basic points, encompassing the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy and international relations; representation of Nigeria in foreign countries by way of High Commissions, Embassies and Consulates; Consular Matters including the protection of interests of Nigerians abroad; maintaining relationships with diplomatic corps and co-ordination of international conferences in the country as well as

ensuring representation of Nigeria at international organisations such as the United Nations, ECOWAS, World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Commonwealth and the AU, to name a few.

Additionally, the ministry is charged with the responsibility of making certain pilgrimage arrangements for the citizens; executing Technical Assistance (TA) programmes or agreements with foreign countries, facilitating the repatriation of destitute Nigerians; issuance of diplomatic passports, travel certificates, merchant navy and seamen identity cards in foreign missions for the citizenry.

The Ministry, above all, has its mission as; “Dedicated to the vigorous pursuit of the vital national interests of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the promotion of African integration and unity, international co-operation for the consolidation of global peace, security, a just world economic order and democratic values, through the execution of statutory duties as it concerns Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives for the benefit of Nigeria and her citizens, by building the capacity to be a major role player in world affairs, and earning the respect of the people of Africa, and the larger international community.”

Similarly, the Ministry’s vision statement implies that it has to build an efficient knowledge based foreign bureau which should be technology driven in service delivery while pursuing Nigeria’s foreign policy goals and objectives. At its headquarters in Abuja, the Ministry has a structure consisting of the minister (s) [purely political appointees who represent the organisation at the Federal Executive Council]. It has a leading minister who reports directly to the President with some assistants as Minister (s) of state, which, in this case are two as earlier mentioned.

In the past 50 years of Nigeria’s independence, the nation has maintained her foreign policy. Although, the approach depends largely on the government of the day, based on the

circumstances of the time and style of leaderships; the substance is usually rooted in set objectives revolving around those principles which the nation had always held as her priorities in the conduct of foreign relations.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAF), Nigeria's foreign policy witnessed unreserved influence guided by a commitment of five principles as her own basic foreign policy objectives which comprise the placing of priorities on safeguarding national security through enhanced extra-territorial strategic arrangement, economic prosperity, defence of national honour, as well as maintenance of peace and security.

Second in the line-up of principles was Nigeria's commitment to the concept of legal equality of all States, irrespective of their sizes or capability.

The third principle is of "non-interference in the internal or domestic affairs of other nation states," (MFA, 3-23-08) while the fourth dwells on influences that guide Nigeria's foreign policy with complete loyalty to multi-lateral diplomacy as demonstrated by Nigeria's vigorous involvement in various international organisations among others. As such, Nigeria prides herself as a "member of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), African Union (AU), Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), African Petroleum Producers Association (APPA), Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and ECOWAS," (MFA March 19, 2007). Nigeria has a relative influence in all these international organisations as expected of a full sovereign nation. The bottom-line is that Nigeria's foreign policy is known to be a dedication to Africa and Pan-Africanism and it is on this premise that successive Nigerian governments have encouraged the unity of all African states, focusing the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and Africans within and in the diaspora.

Therefore, it is apt to state that Nigeria, through the MFA, has achieved much in the areas of keeping the entity together, by way of contributing its quota to regional peace and maintaining its sovereign responsibilities to date. As part of efforts to elevate Nigeria's position in the comity of nations, the Maduekwe-led MAF inaugurated the Foreign Ministers' Forum on Friday, April 4, 2008 in Abuja. This, the ministry explained, includes "former and current Foreign Affairs Ministers and is planned to serve as an informal advisory body on Nigeria's foreign policy and international relations. It is also intended to enhance the institutional memory of the foreign policy establishment." (Olukanni – Nigerian MFA – Accessed June 2008).

In his address to herald the events that marked five decades of Nigerian foreign service, Maduekwe traced succinctly the origin of the Ministry to having been established in September 1957 as an External Affairs Division of the Office of the Prime Minister, adding that it is, indeed, auspicious after half a century for the Ministry to celebrate its achievements, reflect on its past, and rededicate itself to the tasks ahead. Series of event, beginning with the press briefing and the opening of an exhibition of works of arts, were some of the activities lined up to mark the occasion. The exhibition comprised a pictorial presentation, depicting the activities of the Ministry from its early years to the present, including the work of its parastatals. (Nigerian MFA, Accessed June 2008).

However, dwelling on the theme of the celebration: "The Nigerian Foreign Service: Fifty Years of Serving the Nation at Home and Abroad," Maduekwe noted that such services had been rendered in the past through Nigerian embassies, high commissions, permanent missions and distinguished roles of diplomats in international organizations. He stressed that it is through such international bodies as the United Nations, African Union, the ECOWAS, the Commonwealth and so on that Nigeria's enduring interests have been promoted and defended over the years.

“Specifically, we must mention the leadership role that Nigeria has continued to play in the West African sub-region, Africa and in the developing world,” he asserted, emphasizing that Nigeria’s role in the de-colonization struggle in Southern Africa remains a landmark. Such other initiatives as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its Peer Review Mechanism, the African Union and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The external debt and other challenges facing the developing world beyond the specific concerns of Africa have been largely successful because Nigeria provided the critical leadership needed at all times.” (Maduekwe – MFA.gov.ng. Accessed June 2008)

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, as a credible policy think-tank of the nation, was elevated to a parastatal of the Ministry, without forgetting the roles of Nigeria in UN and other peace-keeping operations. Such was the record that Nigeria has been the chairman of the Special Political Committee (C34) which oversees UN peace-keeping operations in different parts of the world. Indeed, Nigeria was in February 2010, re-elected into this Committee.

In his words: “Of course, our role in ECOMOG and peace-keeping, peace-building and resolution in our sub-region also needs no telling. In all these areas, in co-operation with the gallant officers and men of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Ministry, our past and present Foreign Ministers, Missions abroad, Ambassadors and diplomats have played very important roles. And of course, they continue to do so. Nigeria’s peace-keeping experiences led to the establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in Abuja.” (Maduekwe – MFA.gov.ng. Accessed June 2008)

On the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TAC), for instance, the Minister pointed out that the creation of the scheme in 1987 was a major initiative of the Ministry, to coordinate Nigeria's technical assistance to developing countries in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean - known as the APC countries.

Citizen Diplomacy:

Notably from inception, the Nigerian foreign service and the Ministry have been reputed for providing consular services to Nigerians abroad, promoting their welfare and rendering assistance to those in need, including facilitating links and communications with next of kin at home in Nigeria where relevant.

In line with the aforementioned, Maduekwe said, these services include issuance of passports, other travel documents, visas, authentication of documents "and since this administration came into office, the welfare of Nigerians at home and abroad has now been given greater emphasis through the policy of „Citizen Diplomacy.““

Explaining that Citizen Diplomacy as a foreign policy thrust is aimed at re-branding Nigeria's foreign policy under which the Ministry and Missions abroad are totally committed to the welfare and rights of Nigerians at home and abroad, as well as becoming fully-grown development as a robust policy thrust in half a century. Even where Nigerian nationals are alleged to have infringed on the laws of their countries of residence, the ministry ensures that they are still entitled to get what is referred to as "the international minimum standard of treatment."

In this regard, the Ministry is directly involved in:

- i. “Bilateral discussions and negotiations;
- ii. Negotiation, conclusion and implementation of international treaties, bilateral and multilateral agreements;
- iii. Helping to organize and co-ordinate international meetings and conferences in Nigeria;
- iv. Support of government programmes of attracting Foreign Direct Investment;
- v. Trade promotion – sourcing for markets for Nigerian products abroad, especially in the non-oil sectors;
- vi. Promoting the image of Nigeria in co-operation with other Ministries and agencies of Government, including the promotion of Nigerian culture and dissemination of information on Nigeria;
- vii. Promoting the interests and welfare of Nigerian students abroad, including assistance in remittance of fees and other education support services;
- viii. Co-ordinating Christians and Muslim Pilgrimage activities in co-operation with the State Governments and other agencies and arms of government and ensuring their welfare in the Holy Lands.”

The Presidency: Bedrock of foreign policy decisions

In Nigeria, the fact is that several high-level decisions are taken at different centres and locations despite the existence of certain structures like ministries in-charge of core issues at stake. Foreign policy decisions do not elude the Presidency, the centre of government in Nigeria; be it military or civilian administration. Alluding to this fact, Olusanya et al (1990) stated that, owing to the expansion in foreign policy conducts invariably facilitated by the proliferation of issues

and the emergence of new ones, issues which would have imperatively required both bilateral and multilateral international engagements in finding the root or cure have been resolved without stress. Elucidating this, Olusanya et al, noted that in planning the Nigerian Constitution, in 1979 and 1989, the government of the day did not see any limitation to foreign policy making, and did not limit itself to just political and diplomatic relations between the country and the rest of the world. But rather, it saw foreign policy “as the totality of transactions – economic, trade, cultural, financial, political and diplomatic” (Asobie, 1990, p.5).

This position, therefore, makes it possible, for instance, for the Ministry of Trade which handles external trade for the country to become an integral part of the foreign policy. Crude oil sales undertaken on behalf of the government by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources is a major element in Nigeria’s international business transactions, similarly makes the Ministry’s activities a major factor in foreign policy decisions.

Hub of foreign policy in Nigeria:

With the foregoing postulation that the Presidency, especially in Nigeria, is the bedrock of foreign policy decision-making, therefore, may be in order, especially considering some uniqueness about the various governments at different periods of governance in Nigeria since independence.

These indicated that some were during the Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s regime; who became the first Prime Minister in 1957, while his actual leadership role commenced three years later, when Nigeria attained independence. Given that Nigeria practised a parliamentary system at that time, all members of the government were parliamentarians, hence, the Prime Minister being the real head of government then, was making foreign policy decisions on the nation’s behalf.

2.4 Factors affecting Nigeria foreign policy

Since independence, Nigeria's foreign policy has been guided by certain objective and principles. These are:

1. The protection of the sovereign and territorial integrity of the Nigerian State;
2. The promotion of the economic and social well-being of Nigeria.
3. The enhancement of Nigeria's image and status in the world at large;
4. The promotion of unity as well as the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Nigeria and Africa;
5. The promotion of the rights of black people and others under colonial rule;
6. The promotion of international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of world peace and security, mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states;
7. Redressing the imbalance in the international power structures which has tended to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of developing countries;
8. Respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all nations; and
9. The promotion of world peace based on the principles of freedom, mutual respect and equality of the world (Akindele & Ate, 2000:xiv).

According to Akintola (2007:439):

From 1960 to date, Nigeria has maintained a relatively consistent foreign policy considering the fact that the country had experienced varied forms of government within this period. Right from

independence, Africa was the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy with emphasis on the emancipation, development and unity of Africans both within and outside the continent.

Thus, Olusanya and Akindele (1986:3-5) have identified the following five major principles as influencing and guiding the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy:

- Non-alignment (not successful as she unabashedly tilted to the West)
- The legal equality of all states
- Non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states
- Multilateral diplomacy
- Afrocentricism

However from Yar Adua administration to Present, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Yar'Adua administration will espouse what he called Citizens Diplomacy. Although every diplomatic activity must necessarily be centred on the protection of the welfare and wellbeing of the citizens of the country, the administration tried to put citizens as its focus, at least at a conceptual framework. That concept is yet to be properly articulated, its impact is yet to be felt and the result is yet to manifest (Abba, 2009). The criticisms that have followed the introduction and articulation of this new foreign policy thrust have been so much so that nobody takes the government seriously in terms of foreign policy as the government seems to thrive on diplomatic gaffes. The extent of non-articulation and opacity of this newly fangled ludicrous foreign policy that has been gleefully touted as the driver of Nigeria's policy is seen in the fact that this is a standard consular obligation owed Nigerians and not policy.

Over the past two years since the administration of President Yar'Adua took over the reins of governance in Nigeria from Obasanjo, it has become very clear that the issue of foreign policy is not uppermost in the administration's plan. Much as it is not clear what the policy thrust is, the much-touted citizens diplomacy is not even clear what it is meant to achieve as the proponent, Ojo Maduekwe, the Foreign Affairs Minister, has not been able to fully explain what he means by that which is known to be an obligation – that when a country does not treat another country's nationals right, they could also get the same treatment for their own citizens. This means that the current government does not have any foreign policy thrust apart from the traditional Africa-centredness that does not make much meaning anymore given the fact that the commitment to the African continent is now in doubt for a government that cannot sustain its economy or develop nor maintain its infrastructure. A country where citizens are not given the basic amenities with all the wealth that accrues from the petroleum resources the nation is blessed with cannot be serious about its citizens whether in Nigeria or outside the shores of the country. A country where virtually all the sectors of the economy are comatose cannot impose its will on other nations to treat its citizens right when they know Nigeria cannot really do anything, and its leadership does not have the will, to do anything even if provoked. This inactivity on the part of the President and his foreign policy team has left Nigeria as onlookers in a fast moving world.

As further extrapolated by Abba (2009):

Nigeria's voice is not heard in major international fora: Nigeria has initiated nothing spectacular in the last two years at the dynamic global arena and, apart from bilateral agreements which are hardly followed up, Nigeria has gained nothing from diplomatic activities under this government. This is not what is expected of the anchor

nation of the Black world... In the immediate sub-region of ECOWAS whose institutions Nigeria is hosting and substantially funding, Nigerians are not even employed as drivers. For instance, in the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice only 7 percent of the staff are Nigerians, and it is situated here in Abuja... no Nigerian has been elected in the AU commission for the last six years. A nation that has the largest population in Africa is not represented in the African Union Commission. Burkina Faso defeated Nigeria in 2007! Really, what manner of citizen diplomacy is it when the citizens lack representation?

The problem of representation in international affairs has also been giving scholars and the Nigerian populace problems to comprehend how a government refuses to attend global events that other governments fight to ensure they are on board. It is on record that President Yar'Adua has missed many opportunities to address the United Nations General Assembly, but has rather sent his Foreign Affairs Minister, who lacks finesse and diplomatese and most often does not have the capacity to address certain key issues, and ends up either saying the wrong things or committing diplomatic faux pas much to the embarrassment of the Nigerian citizens. In the last instance that left Nigerians shocked, President Yar'Adua opted to go and open a University of Technology in Saudi Arabia when the General Assembly was scheduled to meet, and was eventually received by a mere Governor of a State and not the King who had supposedly invited him. As noted by Onyekwere (2009):

*The seemingly diplomatic indifference of President Umaru
Yar'Adua's administration threatens the little gains the country*

earned under his predecessor just as the international community is reinventing stereotypes against Nigerians, while manufacturing companies relocate to neighbouring countries in droves.

The diplomatic faux pas committed by both the President and his Foreign Affairs Minister have been enough to warrant harsh comments from commentators and scholars. On the purported non-recognition of Kosovo at a meeting in Egypt earlier in the year, Okulaja (2009) quoted Akin Oyeboade of the Department of International Law and Diplomacy, University of Lagos, as follows:

A President is as good as his adviser and the present Nigerian foreign policy is unclear, quite sincerely, whether we you are talking of Darfur, Kosovo or Honduras. There is a poverty of ideas in the Presidency, and I worry about how much of the situation he knows in Kosovo for him to just make such a statement. If he was advised on this at all, then he is ill-advised. A leader just doesn't make a statement, you must be certain about the ramifications of a policy.

From the above, it is clear that the present government has no foreign policy thrust. There seems to be no blueprint of what the government intends to achieve while relating to other nations. Whatever it calls its foreign policy does not seem to have any direction and cannot yield any positive fruits in terms of achieving good objectives for Nigeria. As earlier stated elsewhere,

Foreign policy is not just a matter of talking tough; it has to be seen to be in action. Citizens' diplomacy would become a meaningful foreign policy when Nigerians in Nigeria are treated as they are

worth; when government does its job the way it is supposed to, and when the citizens are made to feel the impact of good governance (Ezirim, 2008:278).

2.5 Contending paradigms in Nigeria foreign policy

A number of theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy have been expounded. These approaches however takes several forms and vary in their attempts to analyse and comprehend international politics and foreign policy. These approaches include realism, behaviouralism, the political economy approaches, dependency and decision making approach.

Pogeson 1995 asserts that realism or power politics held a substantial position in international politics for many years after World War II. Primarily concern with analyzing the basis of peace and order on an otherwise anarchical society, states were seen by realists as sole actors in the international arena, acting with a single mind and will, and engaged in a continuous struggle for survival. Realists lay emphasis on the balance of power concept and assumed that every single state, in any political situation, has national interest which benefits the whole rather than just a part of the state. These national interests are often identified with security, which in turn is perceived as the prime goal of foreign policy. By concentrating on the political man whose primary concern is power, other considerations, like economic, social, cultural considerations, are subordinated while other units of analysis, like geography, history, technology, etc., play only subsidiary roles.

Realist analysts have, however been criticized for their failure to investigate such vital concepts as “national interests” and power. This failure restricts their analysis to specific historical

situations. Also marked cooperation which ensued after World War II made it increasingly “misleading to characterize inter-state relations in Western Europe as international anarchy as suggested by the realists”.

Behaviouralism, on the other hand, represented a movement to encourage the application of specific methods to the study of human behavior. For the first time, there was concerted effort to use specific methods to the study of political activities, thereby resuming the assumption of ‘state-centric’ realism the approach encouraged analysts to look at political actors first as individual with emotion and prejudiced disposition. The individual rather than large political units are center of attention. The political process was related to an explained in terms of the perception, emotion and feelings personalities of the individual. One significant effect of the behavioural approach was the awareness that it was no longer sufficient to explain a particular phenomenon solely in terms of the imperatives of international politics but to also complement this level with an understanding of the behavior of men in an organization, of which the state is one of many. However, because the behavioral approach minimizes or ignores sub-systemic factors like the internal structures and processes, social groups, classes or political pressures, socio economic patterns and ideology and internal crisis, its value in providing a basis for the scientific study of foreign policy is limited.

The Marxist political economy approach, on the other hand is essentially concerned with the inter-meshing of “political, economic and social factors of change in one on-going historical process. The approach highlights the primacy of the material condition of life, stress the dynamic character of social reality and assumes that the different complex elements of the society are related. The most distinguishing feature of the political economy approach is the assumption of the primacy of the material conditions of life in determining the behavior of social groups.

Attention is paid to the modes of production in the international society, the class structure of the society, and the inherent contradictions among social classes. In addition to the materialist perspective, there is the acceptance of dialectics as the basic method of analysis. It assumes both contradictions and the unit of opposition in the internal and external behavior of international actors. By the use of dialectics, a picture of continuing contradictions in society is painted. These contradictions are seen to exist both within and between classes at different stages of their development and also between the constantly developing forces of production and the existing social relations of production such as social classes and legal structures.

Closely related to the Marxist political economy approach, but distinct from it is the dependency framework of analysis. Essentially a 'state-centric' framework, dependency is viewed at two levels. The first equates it with neocolonialism. This view indicates a socio economic structure upon imperialist powers to which the state is an economic and social appendage. The second links it with equitable resource allocation and exploitation. Dependency recognizes the primacy of economic forces in social relations and is concerned with analyzing problems associated with penetration of the political economics of the third world nations by international capitalism. The major weakness of dependency is the over emphasis of the conditioning ability of the international capitalist economy on developments within the periphery to the detriment of local forces like resource endowments, leadership idiosyncrasies, political structure, etc. in the study of the development process of third world countries.

Another approach which is relevant to the study of international relations is the decision making approach. It was developed to serve as 'the core of a frame of reference for the study of international politics'. The objective of its proponents was to identify some of the crucial variables that determine national responses to concrete situations. With its emphasis on

‘decision’ and decision making the major impact of the approach has been on foreign policy analysis. With its focus on the behaviour of the decision makers who are involved in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, the decision making approach can be located within the behaviorist movement. In terms of subject matter and approach, Snyder’s decision making framework represented ‘the first attempt to apply the methodological rigors’ of behaviouralism to foreign policy analysis. The object of study shifted from the state-actor to the decision makers who act on behalf of the state. His supposition was that the actions taken by a set of decision makers are function of the values, social group characteristics, major institutional patterns and ‘non-human’ situation of the internal setting, plus the structures, natural situations and actions of the external setting with which they are in contact. The decision making approach has, however, been criticized by scholars of international relations. Highlighting five arguments against the approach, Ojo and Sesay contend that it ignores the objective reality which constitutes the environment within which foreign policy decisions are made it fails to provide satisfactory explanation of the broader aspects of foreign policy; its distinction between domestic and international politics is unnecessary because the foreign policy concept expresses the interrelationship between the two; its emphasis on the foreign policy of a single state often distracts from the efforts to understand the wider process of international interactions; and that the approach has failed to elucidate a theory that establishes the relationship between the various variables it identifies both at the internal and external environments. Most of the approaches discussed so far tends to assume that states are sufficiently similar for them to be treated as a single category of actors and the state government have effective control of internal developments. These assumptions do not necessarily hold true for developing states. Also, the raw evidence about the policy process in Nigeria, as in many African states, points to the need for

caution in adopting any or all of the approaches as explanatory paradigms for understanding foreign policy. While it is true that at any given time or for any given issue, one of the approaches may give a greater insights than another. It is more viable, given the reticence of the policy makers in this country and the difficulty of penetrating the bureaucracy to focus one's analysis on perceived interaction and factors. It is within this context however that linkage theory was adopted for this study to offer distinct advantages in comparison to other models of analysis

2.6 Understanding the Nigeria foreign policy in the new global realities

Nigeria as a regional power has always focused on African unity and liberation. The nation's foreign policy since independence has been structured around its hegemonic influence within Africa, and to strengthen the foreign policy objectives, Nigeria participates in African Union, ecowas, commonwealth, United Nations and Non-Aligned Movement. Nigeria has had its share of foreign relations with several nations from Africa to Asia and the rest of the world. While its reputation declined between 1993 – 1999, isolated and weakened.

It's a fast globalizing world now, with nations pushing to retain and expand their share in the global economy. New alliances are forming and developing nations like Nigeria are negotiating ways to deal with trade and investment barriers, improve infrastructure through foreign investments, and expand access to financial services to strengthen global and regional trade amongst others.

Nigeria's foreign policy began to react to these new realities when the President Goodluck Jonathan who was then the acting president in 2009. A nation described by Richard Bowden as a failed state that works in his book titled Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles pose a great challenge to diplomats tasked with recreating international image powerful enough to safe guard

national interests while also interacting with other nations as a stable, prosperous country founded on the rule of law.

With the insurgency attacks of boko haram, largely dysfunctional local governments, sleepy Niger-Delta militancy, tribalism in Nigeria's middle-belt, poverty gap, police corruption amongst other rhetoric heard in the global civil right circles and analysts, the duty of establishing quality foreign relation mechanisms is enormous. Adding up to these challenges is the complexity that surrounds forging relationship with China. Despite the Chinese attractive offers to developing nations like Nigeria struggling to meet budget requirements, the moral concerns raised are mostly valid and developing nations in this circumstance risk potent criticism.

With these factors as determinants in foreign policy development, Nigeria under the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Ajumogobia decided to proceed on developing an independent foreign policy for Nigeria that reflected minimal ideological position. In 2012, as a developing middle power despite internal divisions, started to shape assertive foreign policy founded on our sub-region political and military influence coupled with our oil and natural gas reserves.

In line with President Goodluck Jonathan's aspirations, Nigeria's foreign policy has made effort to pursue strong multilateral diplomacy with struggles not to undermine bilateral relationships and agreements. While the independent foreign policy is also creating space for us within the United Nations reforms (Security Council). Meaning Nigeria's foreign policy has improved within the international system. Going back to the concept conceived in the 1960 based on our hegemonic influence, current leadership have made impacts and strategic moves in various international organizations. Olugbenga Ashiru's methodology has ensured Nigeria's partnership

with nations important to our manpower needs, encouraging investments. This is a shift towards international relations that will drive economic growth leveraging on the advantages of our old afro-centric principles. New principles have taken into consideration the new economic powers outside Euro-America, adapting to new international political economy and arrangements.

All though the nation's diplomats may be at the crossroad considering the need to design the core aspects of any nation's foreign policy, the national interests; this involves so many actors that need to unify on the needs and wants of the country. Deciding on this aspect comes with numerous challenges that will trigger the necessary shift from idealistic policies that does not align with our economic agenda to aggressively pursue of our ambitions such as our foreign direct investment goals.

2.7 The Insurgency Group and Foreign Policy Nexus

Threats to the international order of the 20th century—strong, sovereign states—became overshadowed as this century began with a reorientation in foreign policy towards weak and failing states and the terrorist groups that use them as safe havens. Despite Paul Pillar's claim that "terrorism is primarily a foreign policy issue" literature to that effect has been underdeveloped in both international relations and studies in terrorism (Pillar 2001:9). While studies of terrorism and counterterrorism have generally not separated the domestic from international realms of policy response, the academic work on foreign policy has considered terrorism superficially and intermittently (Crenshaw 2004). This disjuncture affects both policy formulation and scholarly discourse; the result has been counterterrorism policies that rarely seek to integrate with the broader foreign policy agenda (Cronin & Ludes 2004; Pillar 2001). Within academia, foreign policy is a subfield of International Relations (IR), while terrorism studies are

often more loosely categorized and interdisciplinary. Studies of foreign policy further branch out into theory, policy analysis, and policy prescription yet terrorism studies have tended to blend these areas of analysis together, lacking a clear framework for research. International

Relations and Terrorism studies differ dramatically in their frameworks, assumptions, and research agendas. The disconnection between these two approaches has made theorizing about the intersection of terrorism and foreign policy difficult for scholars of either field, despite Horowitz's assertion that "terrorism has become a mode of doing politics" (1983: 44). While there has been a dramatic increase in both the quantity and quality of terrorism theory over the last decade, many issues continue to complicate the process of building theories about the nexus of the two.

The development of international law governing terrorism, individual state responses, policy decisions regarding effective response, military actions, and questions of whether deterrence is still possible in the age of decentralized terrorist groups and suicidal terrorism are all points where the theories of international relations, foreign policy concerns of policy makers, and terrorism studies intersect. Other issues demanding attention have been the effects of the evolving organizational structure of terrorist groups, illegal immigration, the radicalization of European Muslims, and the phenomenon recently identified as "swarming," whereby fighters relocate from site to site in different configurations in order to fight or perpetrate attacks and then dissolve (Atran 2006). While these issues have been addressed descriptively in policy journals (i.e. Foreign Affairs, Middle East Policy), their treatment in the academic literature on foreign policy or terrorism is largely underdeveloped.

Before the late 1960s, when the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) began a campaign of airplane hijackings in Europe, terrorism was viewed almost exclusively as an internal problem that fell within the realm of policing, not foreign policy. Then the during the 1972 Munich Olympics, eleven Israeli athletes were captured and held hostage during the Olympic games by a branch of the Palestinian group Fatah, called Black September. The high profile status of the event and the obvious incapability of the West German police led to the development of counterterrorist units within many European states. Because of Munich and the skyjackings, by the late 1970's some foundational counterterrorism policy features emerged, i.e. no negotiations with terrorists, however, these policies remained overwhelmingly oriented toward domestic response mechanisms (Chalk 1997; Kupperman & Trent 1979). Although Europe began developing some counterterror capabilities in the 1970s, Livingstone argues it was not until the 1983-84 attacks on the US embassy and the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon that the United States began to see terrorism as a policy concern, thus elevating it in the international arena (Livingstone 1986). In combination, these events also gradually led to a realization by the academic community that a new "international" terrorism posed a specific and novel threat to which their foreign policy establishments were largely unable to respond.

Silke (2004) criticizes the lack of scholarly interest in international terrorism in the 1990s, as attacks dropped dramatically following the end of the Cold War, and argues that 9/11 was not just a failure of the intelligence system, but also of academia. For example, a search of the SSCI database for "terror* AND foreign policy" turned up 160 results. The data show a dramatic increase in 2006, while the late 1990s reveal virtually no publication on this topic. In fact, from 1984-2000, there were only 15 articles published on terrorism and foreign policy compared with 145 articles between 2001 and the first half of 2008. However, it is important to note that many

journals that deal with terrorism, such as Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism were incorporated into the SSCI relatively late.

2.8 Challenges of Nigeria foreign policy in the 21st century

The Nigerian Prime Minister Alh Tafawa Balewa at the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly meeting when Nigeria became the body's 99th member on the 7th of October, 1960 when he asserted that, Nigeria will continue to maintain friendly relations with all nations, respect the sovereignty of states, develop cultural cooperation as a means of strengthening political ties with all African states, commitment to African's peace, development, cooperation, decolonization and fight against racism and apartheid³ thus, Africa the center piece of our foreign policy.

The first test of Africa as the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy came in 1961 when she championed the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations and severed diplomatic relations with France following the French testing of atomic bomb in the sahara⁴. Equally important was her contributions of forces in the Congo crisis of 1961 which Colonel Aguiyi Ironsi led a United Nations (UN) delegation to quell the crisis. In 1963, Nigeria under the leadership of Sir Tafawa Balewa founded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now Africa Union (AU) with other African leaders and contributed greatly to the decolonization process of the continent.

Henceforth, successive governments that followed thereafter acted in the same direction. General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) for example was conscious to assert Nigeria's sincere efforts to champion decolonization and stamp her leadership position in Africa. He was even known for the

payment of the salaries of civil servants of other countries in the name of establishing friendly neighborliness and also the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States⁶. The General Murtala/Obasanjo administration (1975-1979) that followed was more drastic and dynamic in his liberation struggles such that it is recorded that as of 1975, Nigeria under him spent a woofing sum of \$2million to liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) hosted the Lagos Action Plan of 1980 to look at the reasons why Africa is not developing economically. This development has span through General Muhammed Buhari (1983-1985) General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) General Abdusalamin Abubakar (1998-1999) Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (1999- 2007) Alhaji Umaru Yar'adua (2007-2010) and Dr. Goodluck Jonathan (2010 till date) desire for an African policy and their collective resolve to champion the interest of Africa. Alhaji Umaru Yar'adua for example after his inauguration in 2007 promised to continue with the catch phrase of Africa the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. This is also true with President Goodluck Jonathan who during his visit to the United State in 2010 also promised to follow in the footsteps of successive Nigeria's leaders who have firm believe in African affairs.

According to Dr Sule Lamido (2012) the Nigerian foreign minister 1999-2003. He highlighted the challenges of Nigeria foreign policy to be :

- **The National Economy and Debt Burden**

Although President Obasanjo seems to have cleared a bit of the national debt, it however does not stop it from increasing by day this placed constrains on the conduct of our foreign policy in two reinforcing ways. The first was the weakness of the economy. One's foreign rating and influence in a very fundamental sense is a reflection of the health and size of one's economy.

While Nigeria had a large economy, it was in a state of crisis that makes it difficult to realize its full potential.

- **“The Challenge of The War Industry”**

There have been too many conflicts in the continent: from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Rwanda and now Mali and several other pockets across the continent, these have been serious strain on the economy of the country. We have our own border conflicts with especially Cameroun which is still nationally to be resolved to the satisfaction of all.

Nigeria has a long history of involvement in peace keeping. Some of the most recent peace keeping efforts include Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The involvement of the country in mediating to resolve these conflicts is not only a drain in human and material resources but also creates conflicting perceptions among different actors in the conflicts, which are carried along in other forums such as in the African Union as well in international platforms. In addition to these regional and other conflicts within the African continent, apart from the various strife from African states, Nigeria itself has its own share of internal conflicts with pockets of communal, ethnic and religious conflicts across the country, also worthy of mention is the insurgency attack by Boko Haram. This puts the credibility of the country in question in terms of our weight to intervene successfully to resolve African conflicts when we ourselves are not able to resolve our own internal conflicts.

- **The Dynamics of a Peculiar Federal System**

A cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the country was that foreign policy should be used to enhance the condition of the citizens. Sometime such direct benefits for citizens are found within bilateral or regional-based platforms. Sometimes these bilateral and or regional platforms might have some coloration such as religion as is the case with any relationship with the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Vatican. Given Nigeria peculiar federalism, relationships like these are often generally viewed with suspicion of some sort of hidden agenda by the other side and most often result in unnecessary and unhealthy controversy in the country. This sort of suspicion has not allowed the country to benefit from the potential of such relationships. This peculiarity that is the result of our great diversity needs a policy making framework that will allow for identification and ownership of its initiatives by the different interest groups in the Nigeria project.

- **Continental Plurality and Consensus Building**

One of the policy objectives of the country is to continue to play a leading role in African affairs. This is why the country is always ready and willing to contribute to defending the territory or keeping the peace in other African countries. It was also in that spirit that the Technical Aid programme has been continued. Actualizing this has not been easy. Recent events at the African continental fora where candidates backed by Nigeria have lost elections indicate that the country is still far from achieving its objective of playing leading roles in African affairs.

2.9 Insurgency groups in Nigeria.

Every regime is accompanied by new ethnic militia whose angst always include injustice in resource control, power centralisation, relative deprivation in political and economic

opportunities, poor governance, etc; The current ‘crisis of governance’ represents a manifestation of loss of control by the Nigeria’s post-colonial state and the kind of leadership it throws up. In March 2005, an independent panel of experts on Sub-Saharan Africa convened by the U.S. government’s National Intelligence Council predicted the “outright collapse of Nigeria” within the next fifteen years. Nigeria’s government promptly rejected the report and labelled its authors as “prophets of doom”. Current realities ranging from perennial communal clashes in the middle-belt region, MOSOP, MEND, OPC, MASSOB to BOKO – HARAM.

The Islamist insurgency in Nigeria, also known as the Sharia Conflict in Nigeria, began in 1999 with the establishment of sharia law in several Muslim-majority states in Northern Nigeria, despite the secular Constitution of Nigeria and the disagreeing Christian minority. From 2000 onwards, occasional riots between Christians and Muslims have resulted in thousands of deaths. Since 2009, when the Islamist group Boko Haram started an armed rebellion against the secular government of Nigeria, the conflict has become more violent. In 2010, 55 people were killed in claimed or suspected Boko Haram attacks. By 2013, the annual death toll exceeded 1000, with a further sharp increase occurring in early 2014.

According to a Nigerian study on demographics and religion, Muslims make up 50.5% of the population. Muslims mainly live in the north of the country; the majority of the Nigerian Muslims are Sunnis. Christians are the second-largest religious group and make up 48.2% of the population. They predominate in the central and southern part of the country.

As Muslims narrowly form the majority of the population, many of them demand the introduction of Sharia – the Islamic law – as the main source of legislation. Twelve Northern states have introduced sharia as a basis of the executive and judicial branches of government in

the years 1999 and 2000. Part of the agitation of the newly formed Boko haram is the introduction of Islamic state in the country. The group conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. That changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. Prior to that the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organisation, including that of a military officer.

When the government came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people. During the fighting with the security forces Boko Haram fighters reportedly "used fuel-laden motorcycles" and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station. The group's founder and then leader Mohammed Yusuf was also killed during this time while still in police custody. After Yusuf's killing, a new leader emerged whose identity was not known at the time.

After the killing of M. Yusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January 2010. It resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity.

In January 2012, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf, appeared in a video posted on YouTube. According to Reuters, Shekau took control of the group after Yusuf's death in 2009. Authorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in 2009. By early 2012, the group was responsible for over 900 deaths.

2.10 Gap in Literature

Although there is already some in-depth academic literature on Boko Haram, by Nigerian and Western scholars but none has fully discuss the nature of the insurgency group in this light. The point of departure of this discussion will be illustration and the analysis of how the Boko Haram insurgency group has gone global and how this their “globalization” has affected Nigeria foreign policy.

CHAPTER THREE

Internationalization of Boko Haram in Nigeria

3.1 The Emergence of Boko Haram in the Northern Nigeria: Issues, Trends and Activities.

It is important to state from the outset that an attempt to forcefully impose religious ideology or belief on the Nigerian society since her independence in 1960 especially in the Northern part is not new. The first major attempt in the post-colonial period was led by the leader of the Maitatsine sectarian group in 1980s and eventually led to large scale uprisings. Thus, it can therefore be said that the emergence of this dreaded Islamic sect popularly known as the Boko Haram had its root and inspiration from colonial period as well as from the “Maitatsine” uprisings of the early 1980s in particular. Although Boko Haram could be compared in terms of philosophy or ideology and objectives to the Maitatsine sectarian group, its organizational planning, armed resistance, and modus operandi is Taliban (Danjibo, 2009). During the colonial era, a revolutionary Mahdism which received little elite support but attracted “radical clerics” disgruntled peasants and fugitive slaves sought unsuccessfully to overthrow the British colonial regime which controlled the Sokoto Caliphate founded after the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio. With stark resonance to today, northern Muslim elites made a pact with the British colonialists that they would rule indirectly in return for British education not being imposed on the protectorate (Dearn, 2011). The Maitatsine uprisings of the early 1980s, inspired by Cameroonian dissident preacher Muhammadu Marwa, catalyzed by massive socioeconomic inequality and, following on from constitutional debates in 1977 which polarized the country, were the first incidence of Islamic fundamentalist agitation against the secular state. At around the same time, two other

Islamic fundamentalist groups emerged, Jama'atu Izalatil Bidi'a Wa'iqamatic Sunna ("Society of Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of the Sunna"), founded 1978 in Jos and known as "Izala", and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a Shiite movement led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, funded by Iran and in which Yusuf was thought to be a "major player" - exactly how and when Yusuf was involved and how this related to his links with Sheikh Jafar is unclear (Dearn, 2011). Though some people have argued that both groups have been associated with Boko Haram's modern incarnation, there is no substantial evidence to justify this.

In 2009, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria rebutted claims that El-Zakzaky was the founder of Boko Haram, arguing it could never be so against Western education when it owns 300 schools in Nigeria which teach a mixture of Islamic and Western education. Izala threatened legal action against publishers of pictures of its members labelled as Boko Haram foot soldiers. What is clear is that the combination of constitutional debates in the 1970s, military rule under successive despots – including the jailing of El-Zakzaky by Sani Abacha's regime entrenched poverty in the areas where such groups are active and have been grist to the fundamentalists' mill (Dearn, 2011) The time that this Islamic militant group emerged in the country is yet unknown. There were series of conflicting reports on their emergence in the northern part of the country. Information at the disposal of the different security agencies pieced together by Sunday Tribune of 12th February, 2012 indicated that contrary to the widely-held belief that the Boko Haram started around 2003, the group has been existing since 1995. It was, however, confirmed that the entry of slain Mallam Mohammed Yusuf successfully radicalized the group and opened it to foreign collaboration, especially with the Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Details obtained by investigators revealed that the Jama'atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (Brethren united in the pursuit of holy war), also known as Boko Haram, started off its activism

in 2001, under the leadership of the late Yusuf. From that year, the group had intensified its propagation of an extreme Islamic doctrine, which sees Western education and democracy as corruptive and immoral (Sunday Tribune, 2012).

In 1995, the group was said to be operating under the name Shabaab, Muslim Youth Organization. It operated from the Indimi Mosque, located along Damboa Road, Maiduguri, Borno State and had one Mallam Lawal as leader and another Mallam Usman as secretary. It was learnt that in 1999, Lawal left Nigeria for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, thereby yielding the leadership of the group to the man known as Mustapha Modu Jon, commonly called Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf's leadership was said to have opened the group to political influences and increased popularity. Although Yusuf's religious activism was linked to Kano, where he had brushes with popular Islamic clerics, he was said to have laid the foundation for the growth of the organisation. Details about the late Yusuf, however, indicated that, first, he was a favourite student of prominent Nigerian Islamic scholar Sheikh Jafar Mahmud Adam and hailed from Gingir village in Jakusko Local Government Area of Yobe State. He was born on 29 January 1970, married four wives and had 12 children. By year 2000, Yusuf had won the respect and confidence of some clerics and youths at Indimi Mosque. He started presiding over some mosque activities and along the line; he upstaged all the teachers to emerge a leader. Many youths who followed him saw the older clerics as secular and anti-Sharia. According to the report, majority of his followers were largely illiterate youths who engaged in petty trading or had dropped out of school (Danjibo, 2009) As time went on, Yusuf then established his own mosque in an area called Railway Quarters in Maiduguri, while also extending his preaching to the mosques located at Kandahar, Unguwar Doki (near Monday Market) and Millionaire's Quarters. Investigators were also told that by early 2004, the Islamic sect had grown in states of

presence with Borno, Yobe and Bauchi being notable and that some of the converted youths abandoned their studies to join the group. The ready-made army of followers were, however, said to be the Almajiri. It was after 2004 that the sect leaders were said to have established links with the Algerian Salafist Group, now known as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Magreb, (AQIM), which gave them training on combat and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

From trainings acquired in AQIM, it was gathered that members of Boko Haram were able to show dexterity in handling of weapons and manufacture of what is called “dirty bombs” through IEDs (Danjibo, 2009, Nigerian Tribune 30, January, 2012) It was reported that many Islamists were not satisfied by the adoption of Sharia law in 12 northern states between 1999 and 2001. They believed that its introduction has been watered down. It was also perceived by these Islamic fundamentalists that an imported system of government based on “Western values” has resulted in ostensible corruption, poverty, unemployment and the continued suppression of “true” Islam in northern part of the country (Danjibo, 2009). Therefore, the best approach to understand the ideology and philosophy of the movement is by explaining the two key words- Boko and Haram. In Hausa language, the word boko is an equivocal term which means either book, Western or foreign; while the word haram is an Arabic derivative meaning forbidden, ungodly, or sinful (Danjibo, 2009. 7; Adesoji, 2010.100). If the words are literally pieced together book haram means book is sinful. But it’s deeper meaning is that, forbid everything Western and Western education- Western education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden (Danjibo, 2009; Adesoji, 2010). What can be drawn make from the above is that, the movement is not only characteristically opposed, but outrightly rejects Western education, Western culture and modern science. Alternatively, it embraces and advocates the propagation of and strict adherence to Islam by all and sundry regardless of anyone’s personal

wishes. In line with this objective, the movement seeks to impose Sharia across all Nigerian states (Bumah, 2009). The former leader Mohammed Yusuf said education “spoils the belief in one God”. The sect – full name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad ("People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad") – seeks to create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Nigeria by, seemingly, whatever means it has at its disposal and at whatever human cost it deems necessary (Bumah, 2009).

The intent of the movement is aimed at replacing modern state formation with the traditional Islamic state, because Western values run contrary to Islamic values. Umma Mahammadiya- Muslim faithful and Dar-ul-Islam- Islamic community cannot be compromised in the face of Western influence in the Nigerian secular society. Therefore, the moral decadence and evil in the society is as a result of the embrace of Western civilization, and thus, in order to curb such evil, an Islamic society must be entrenched by destroying modern political institutions and infrastructures. The philosophy goes hand in hand with the entrenchment of the Shari'a law in the society. The embedded philosophy of the Boko Haram movement can be inferred to explain the reason why police and armed forces formations, government establishments and properties are the target of destruction by the movement. In addition, it is also an ideological belief of the movement that, any member who fight and die- either by suicide bombing in the process of establishing a Sharia state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment would automatically go to Aljanna- paradise or heaven (Danjibo, 2009). One could then understand the reason why the movement has large and committed followers among the Almajiris- Qur'an trainees who depend on their Mallamteacher for knowledge, inspiration and their daily survival. The ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram movement was aptly captured by Tell Magazine thus: The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where orthodox

Islam is practised. Orthodox Islam according to him (Yusuf Mohammed, leader of the sect) frowns at Western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government including security agencies like police, military and other uniformed personnel should be crushed (Tell, 10th August, 2009, p. 34).

Another major issue about this Islamic sect has to do with the strategy being employed in carrying out its activities which have taken series of dimensions since its emergence. This development has made a number of scholars and stakeholders in the country as well as international community to conclude that the sect has different kinds of support from known terrorist nations of the world. First, the modus operandi of the Boko Haram movement, which has been fashioned after the Taliban in Afghanistan, has made some to conclude that the sect must have sent its members to Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mauritania and Algeria for training. Other argued it could be that the Boko Haram modelled itself after the Taliban simply to acknowledge its source of inspiration. Some equally said that it was meant to attract sympathy and support from the Taliban or related groups. Another view was that, it could also be that the links actually exist. For instance, the Operation Sawdust that was carried out in 2005 by the military and the police and which covered North-East geo-political zones of Borno, Bauchi and Yobe, led to the arrest of some Islamic fundamentalists whose activities posed a threat to the security of the Nigerian state. Among those arrested was Yusuf Mohammed, the leader of the Boko Haram movement. These arrests provided the first clues about the links between Boko Haram and the Al-Qaeda terrorist group as those arrested along with Yusuf Mohammed revealed they had been trained in the act of terrorism in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq. Items recovered during the operation included maps and diagrams of government establishments and of

some directions to specific government buildings in Abuja (Tell, 17th August, 2009, p. 69; Danjibo, 2009, p.15). Recent reports in the Nigerian and foreign press about the activities of such groups as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC) in Algeria, Tablighi clerics from Pakistan, and Wahabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia in Northern Nigeria, as well as the report of the training of some fundamentalists in Al-Qaeda camps in some foreign countries, offer proof of Boko Haram's links with fundamentalist groups around the world are to certain extent true (Adesoji, 2010). It is abundantly clear from the available evidence that the sect is against anything that has to do with western values in the country in general and northern part in particular. This could be seen in a large number of attacks being unleashed on the Nigerian State with a view to achieving their objectives.

3.2 Boko Haram and the involvement of the Western Powers

Prior to the Chibok attack, Nigerian pride had prevented it from overtly seeking foreign assistance against Boko Haram. Under intense popular and diplomatic pressure, that rubicon has now been crossed and US and other states' special forces and reconnaissance aircraft may stay on in Nigeria well beyond the current abduction crisis under the logic of protecting civilians. President Jonathan's announcement in early May of an extra-budgetary \$1 billion for emergency military procurement is an added incentive for international security cooperation.

Boko Haram's ideology is strongly opposed to Western influence in Nigeria. In 2012, Boko Haram released a video calling for jihad against the United States, Israel, and Great Britain. However, Boko Haram has never directly targeted any of these nations. In response to Boko

Haram's recent abduction of over 250 school girls and threats sell them, both the United States and Great Britain offered advisers to support the Nigerian government's recovery effort.

Due to the incompetence of the police, a coalition of security operatives around the world went probing the **Thursday's** bomb blast which rocked the Police Headquarters, Abuja. Some agencies allegedly ordered by the presidency indicated that a number of operatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States of America (USA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States and officials of Saudi Intelligence Agency are already working with Nigeria to unravel the sources of the bombs used by Boko Haram sect for the attack.

Nigerian officials eventually decided to cooperate fully with international agencies because of the widespread belief that the dreaded Al-Qaeda group is behind moves to destabilize countries of the world, using different groups. Reports later confirmed that "There is an ongoing alliance involving the Metropolitan Police, the FBI, the CIA and other agencies including the Saudi Arabia intelligence. They are looking at evidence confirming that the Boko Haram sect members were trained in Dafur, Libya, Iraq and Sudan."

The US had revealed the existence and intentions of BH before now. For instance, In the past few years, US intelligence assessments reveals that BH elements had received training from Al-Qaeda-linked militants based in Mali, warning that BH was getting more sophisticated. (US NMS, 2008). The Commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Carter F. Ham, had revealed in 2001 that BH is one of the three African terrorist groups (the other two being the Shabaab of Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) "(that) have very explicitly and publicly voiced an intent to target Westerners and the US specifically", and that the three

organizations have agreed to “collaborate and synchronize their efforts”, drawing attention to the public proclamation by BH that it planned closer cooperation with Al-Qaeda on the Islamic Maghred (AQIM) and with Al-Shabaab (the Somalia-based militant group). (The New York Times, 26 Dec. 2011).

That BH is a terrorist, indeed an anarchist, organization is borne out of the fact that it gravitates towards the existence of no government in Nigeria. Its International terrorist tag is based on confirmation by BH that it receives funding, training and logistic support from Al-Qaeda outside Nigeria (“elements of BH have made contact with external groups”); the confirmation by BH spokesman, Abu Qaeda, confirmed that the sect met with Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in August 2011 where they cemented BH’s funding and logistic base; the trip made by BH’s current leader, Abubakar Shekau, and others to Saudi Arabia in August 2011 to conclude arrangements for technical and logistic support from Al-Qaeda leaders whom Mohamed Shekau calls “our elder brothers”; close cooperation between Recruits from neighboring Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Algeria and Nigerian-based BH; the smuggling of the weapons used by BH in Nigeria from Libya by Al-Qaeda and BH through Chad and Niger; (Olagunju , 2012).

In June, the U.S. government designated Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau, an individual terrorist and set a reward of \$7 million for information leading to his location. Though the November 13 FTO designation received media attention, its practical consequences are limited, most involving visa restrictions and checks on financial support of American origins.

3.3 Boko Haram and Other Terrorist Groups Links

In 2010 Boko Haram released a statement offering support and pledging alliance to the Afghani Taliban and Al-Qa'ida Central. In the same statement Boko Haram conceded to not currently having contact with either group. Although ideologically both groups have strongly impacted Boko Haram, there is no evidence that either has provided any material form of support.

The Islamic Maghreb of (AQLIM, or AQIM) has worked extensively with Boko Haram, including training individuals who are now members of Boko Haram as early as the mid-2000s. Although the exact beginning and extent of the relationship is unknown, in 2010 AQLIM released statements offering training, supplies, and militants to support Boko Haram. Since 2011, AQLIM has provided Boko Haram with financing, including reportedly facilitating donation lines from organizations in Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, trainings and weapons. The two organizations conduct joint operations in Mali and the magnitude of AQLIM's influence on Boko Haram can be seen in their increasingly sophisticated and coordinated attacks.

Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram share similar ideologies and in 2011 Boko Haram member Mamman Nur reportedly received trainings from Al-Shabaab in Somalia before launching an attack against the United Nations headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011.

Since its formation in 2002 and move to greater militancy in 2009, Boko Haram has ideologically and militarily opposed the Nigerian government. Boko Haram wishes to create an Islamic state in Nigeria and has targeted government security forces throughout its existence. This they have done in response to the ISIS declaration of Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) has provided training camps and conducted joint operations with Boko Haram militants in Mali. The groups are ideologically aligned and wish to establish Sharia beyond the borders of their respective home bases.

As customary with Al Qaeda, the two top corners of the posters bore a symbol of an opened Quran flanked on each side by Kalashnikov assault rifles and a flag in the middle — mirroring the logo of al-Qaeda in the North Africa. The message warned the public against assisting the police or going near soldiers guarding the town at night. The message also acknowledged a recent reward offered for information leading to the arrest of suspected sect members.

Daily newsStudy reports that There are very strong indications to suggest that al-Qaeda, the global terror organization founded by the late Osama Bin Laden, may have taken control of the notorious and deadly Jama'atu Ahliss-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram. The alleged arrowhead of the take-over, which is the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, has its headquarters in Algeria which they had been in collaboration with AQIM since 2010. As far back as 2010, intelligence sources said “the Algerian government had said available intelligence reports confirmed that extremist Nigerian Islamic group, Boko Haram, has linked up with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which has its North African headquarters in Algeria.” “The revelation confirms Nigeria’s intelligence services assessment and worries that the previously unknown group has received training and support from al Qaeda. The Algerian Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdelkader Messahel, confirms that the intelligence report showed both groups had been coordinating.

Various reports showed that the Boko Haram parleyed the North African branch of the al-Qaeda group and pasted posters in some areas in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, declaring loyalty

to Al Qaeda. This posters by the sect appeared at key intersections in the city of Maiduguri bearing the name of Imam Abubakar Shekau, the group's de facto leader and representative of Al Qaeda network in Nigeria.

The former leader of a Nigerian Islamic sect behind the 2009 uprising which killed hundreds of people recently issued a statement expressing solidarity with al Qaeda and threatening the United States. From available reports Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy leader of the Boko Haram sect, who was thought to have been killed by police in last year's fighting, offered condolences for the deaths of al Qaeda commanders in Iraq in the statement on a jihad's website. His words: "Do not think jihad is over. Rather jihad has just begun. O America, die with your fury." Further investigations showed that the statement was addressed to al Qaeda affiliated groups in Algeria, Somalia and Yemen, as well as Iraq.

This Islamist sect terrorizing and orchestrating deadly attacks in Northern Nigeria has said that it associates from Somalia have arrived Nigeria to orchestrate fiercer and deadly attacks in the country. Their spokesman reportedly said: "Very soon, we will wage jihad...We want to make it known that our guerrilla fighters arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable."

The group, headquartered in Borno, has allegedly been in existence since 1995, though under many different names. Boko Haram, as it is known today, did not come to prominence until 2003 when Yusuf was elected the new leader. Since then incidents have been sporadic.

Boko Haram first began to appear in 2002 and quickly acquired the moniker of "Nigerian Taliban" with initial leadership under Mohammed Yusuf (Cook, 2011; Hill, 2010) and with a stated goal of a Shariah state in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011; Joselow, 2011).

Understanding the larger factors within Nigeria and the particulars of Boko Haram as a group, certain comparisons and contrasts can now be drawn between Boko Haram and the various al Qaeda franchises in order to determine if any potential synergies exist.

Shortly after the 26 Aug 2011 attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Somali Al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab were linked to Boko Haram (Francis, 2011). These concerns are buttressed by documentation that verbal communications have been made between AQIM and Boko Haram, as well as sightings of a Nigerian leading an al Shabaab cadre; moreover, Mamman Nur, the Boko Haram member responsible for the United Nations bombing executed the attack after arriving home from Somalia (Joselow, 2011). But tactical linkages are not enough. Instead, it's important to explore how each al Qaeda franchise acquired its status to determine if Boko Haram is on the same trajectory.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is one example. Although its leader, Abu Moussab al Zarqawi, was familiar with bin Laden and Zawahiri and had tactical linkages with AQ Central, having been dispatched to Iraq in 2002 at their request (Riedel, 2008), his group, al Tawhid wal Jihad, proceeded to bomb both the Jordanian Embassy and the United Nations Headquarters in Iraq in 2003; it was not until 28 Oct 2004 when he requested that his group receive al Qaeda franchise status (Ould Mohamedou, 2011b). The status was verbally granted by bin Laden two months later, and was made official in June of 2006 when bayaat was sworn (Ould Mohamedou, 2011b). This indicates a wait time of two years, in addition to the years of prior tactical linkages.

The Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) embraced global jihad in the earlier part of the last decade, eventually merging with al Qaeda in 2006 as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Lebovich, 2011), with its signature attack being a bombing of

Algeria's UN Headquarters in 2007 (Thornberry & Levy, 2011). In June 2004, Abdelmalek Droukdel assumed command of GSPC and immediately sought ties with al Qaeda via a secret letter sent to Abu Moussab al Zarqawi as well as providing a substantial number of foot soldiers for Iraq (Ould Mohamedou, 2011a). 11 Sept 2006, the five year anniversary of the 9/11 raid and little more than two years after Droukdel reached out to al Qaeda (via Abu Moussab al-Zarqawi and its Iraq franchise), Ayman al-Zawahiri, then AQ's Number Two, released a video recording attesting to their franchising (Thornberry & Levy, 2012). Almost immediately, there was a significant improvement in tactics as well, which involved transitioning away from traditional guerrilla tactics and towards terrorism tactics with a focus on mass casualties and civilian targeting, as well as AQ's signature tandem strikes (Thornberry & Levy, 2012). Much like al Qaeda in Iraq, AQIM had years of tactical linkages and a two year wait before being granted franchise status.

One of the initial key drivers for the development and eventual radicalization of GSPC was governance failures (Thornberry & Levy, 2012). However, as their ideology developed, it progressed towards both a global Salafi jihad and a rejection of domestic apostate rule (Thornberry & Levy, 2012). This is not unlike Boko Haram's ideological progression.

On Thursday, 09 Feb 2012, Somali terrorist group al Shabaab released a tape from leader Mukhtar Abu al Zubeir pledging allegiance to al Qaeda, and the gesture was officially received in a statement from Ayman al Zawahiri, current leader of al Qaeda (Kelly & Cruickshank, 2012). This is significant in that while the two groups have long had low-level tactical linkages, the initial overture for merger came in the form of an Oct 2009 video recording entitled "At Your Service Osama" (Farrall, 2011; Kelly & Cruickshank, 2012). In the intermediate timeframe, al Shabaab's largely parochial strategy took on a more regional and international overtone. No

longer were they content with creating a domestic Salafist regime, but instead were looking outward with new tactics, as evidenced by the simultaneous attacks in Uganda July 2011 (Kelly & Cruickshank, 2012).

But before the merger of al Shabaab with al Qaeda, there was rampant speculation as recently as July 2011 as to whether they would merge. Part of al Shabaab's downside was that it was not necessarily the leading organization in its respective nation and this contributed to its failure to acquire an invitation from AQ (Farrall, 2011). It then unified with Hisbul Islamiyah and adopted a more global outlook, however there was still a perceived downside due to excessive tactics that pushed away the local populations (Farrall, 2011). Analysts again trained their eye on al Shabaab with the death of Osama bin Laden and the ascendance of Ayman al Zawahiri, who has a keener eye on the acquisition of territory (Farrall, 2011). Truly there was considerable debate as to whether or not al Shabaab would merge with al Qaeda, with astute focus on the advantages and disadvantages to both sides.

While al Qaeda is generally considered to be in a very weak state, this merger provided benefits to both parties, translating into an increased profile and potential funding for al Shabaab, and an expansion of geographic footprint and potential basing for al Qaeda. Moreover, with several dozen US citizens at al Shabaab camps, it provides for a situation in which al Qaeda gains access to US passport holders.

Of late AQIM has tended to focus southwards across the Sahel instead of north along the Maghreb/Mediterranean (Le Sage, 2011), putting it on a geographic tack towards Nigeria and Boko Haram. In 2010, an overture of sorts was made, although instead of proceeding from Boko Haram to al Qaeda, it came from AQIM to Boko Haram: "We are ready to train your children to

use weapons and will supply them with all we can, including support and men, weapons, ammunitions and equipment, in order to defend our people in Nigeria and respond against the aggression of the Christian minority,” (Le Sage, 2011). This overture was reciprocated on 2 Oct 2010 when Muhammed Abu Bakr bin Muhammed al-Shakwa pledged bayaat to Droukdel (Guidere, 2011), creating an indirect oath of loyalty to AQ Central (Guidere, 2011).

The instability brought on by the “Arab Spring” in 2011, specifically with the collapse of the Ghadhafi regime in Libya, has created a political vacuum across the Sahel. Weapons proliferation, armed violence by Tuareg rebels, and a food shortage have added to the region’s already challenging atmosphere.

AQIM is one of the main beneficiaries of such instability. Although the organization’s original objective is the dismantling of the Algerian government, AQIM has evolved into a transnational organization operating across the Sahel. The security vacuum created by Libya has made it easier for AQIM to destabilize the region, thus expanding its influence—hence, its engagement with Boko Haram. While Boko Haram and AQIM possess separate interests, the relationship is mutually beneficial—Boko Haram militants are trained and resourced, and AQIM has an established connection in Nigeria.

Boko Haram is also well connected to other organisations in al-Qaeda's broader network. For example, Ansar al-Din (AAD), a group that received funding, logistical and military support from AQIM, hosted hundreds of members of Boko Haram in territory it controlled in Timbuktu. An al-Qaeda offshoot, the Movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), has also worked and trained alongside Boko Haram in Mali. According to the United Nations, "a number

of Boko Haram members fought alongside al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali in 2012 and 2013", a reference to AQIM, MUJAO and AAD.

The links between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda are complicated by the presence of Ansaru, the Boko Haram offshoot that in the past have referred to themselves as "al-Qaeda in the land beyond the Sahel". The Jamestown Foundation's Jacob Zenn has outlined Ansaru's connections to AQIM and al-Shabaab, while it is Ansaru that likely conducted the August 2011 suicide bombing of the UN building in Nigeria's capital, Abuja. This attack led to 26 deaths and fears that Nigeria's jihadists were beginning to be increasingly tied to al-Qaeda's internationalist agenda. However, Ansaru's operational activity has now slowed, and it is now thought that some Ansaru leaders have rejoined Boko Haram.

3.4 Boko Haram and African countries involvement

Boko Haram is 90 per cent Kanuri-based with its membership drawn from the Kanuri of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Boko Haram has been launching attacks from those territories on communities in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, with the latest being the abduction of over 200 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State

Hailemariam Desalegn Ethiopian Prime Minister Asserted

“You know terrorism is not African agenda only. There has been terror attack in Boston, United States and many parts of the globe. So, it is not something that is new to Nigeria, Ethiopia and other African countries. It is a global phenomenon and you see that there was terror attack in Iraq recently and is expanding.

“We have to see it as a global phenomenon that has to be tackled together in unison. It should not be left to this or that region or this or that country. We have to bear in mind the genesis of this terrorism,”

The mentioning of the Chadian President Mr Deby by the Australian negotiator Mr Stephen Davis added a new dimension to the Boko haram sponsorship dynamics. It was reported by the Nigerian Intelligent Officials that in 2011, a strong Boko Haram army was also beneficial to the Chadian President, as it provided a ready army and possible refuge for a president that was then facing a growing distrust from his legitimate army. However, the Chadian government support for the sect was made majorly through his friendship with Mr Sheriff and at the expense of his country’s relationship with Nigeria.

3.5 U.S. Policy toward Boko Haram Insurgency

Obama Administration officials have viewed Boko Haram primarily as a locally focused, but potentially regional extremist threat in West Africa. U.S. policy toward the group is guided by an assessment of the extent to which it poses a direct threat to the United States and U.S. interests, and is also influenced by U.S.-Nigeria relations. Other terrorist threats on the continent have demanded greater attention and resources from the United States—Al Shabaab, in Somalia, continues to be ranked by Administration officials as the primary terrorist threat in Africa, although extremist groups in North Africa and the Sahel have been viewed as an increasing threat in recent years.⁴⁵ The State Department designated three individuals linked to Boko Haram as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) in June 2012, including Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, and in June 2013 it issued a \$7 million reward for information on the

location of Shekau through its Rewards for Justice program.⁴⁶ In November 2013, the State Department designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. International attention to Boko Haram's abduction of the young women in Chibok elevated the group's status among U.S. policy makers in May 2014, and the U.S. government has deployed additional resources to the region to support Nigerian efforts to counter the group.

Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Nigeria, a top recipient of U.S. foreign aid, as a critically strategic country on the African continent. It is Africa's largest economy and its most populous country, with almost 180 million people, roughly divided between Muslims and Christians. Its Muslim population is among the world's largest. The Nigerian government is an influential actor in African politics, and the country holds a rotating seat on the U.N. Security Council in 2014-2015. In early 2014, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, outlined various threats facing the country, including "critical terrorism threats from Boko Haram and persistent extremism in the north, simmering ethno-religious conflict ... and militants who are capable of remobilizing in the Niger Delta and attacking the oil industry." Clapper also warned about "rising political tensions and violent internal conflict" in the lead-up to the country's 2015 election, warning that "protests and upheaval, especially in northern Nigeria, are likely in the event of President Goodluck Jonathan's reelection." Many U.S. officials, while stressing the importance of the U.S-Nigeria relationship and the gravity of security threats within and emanating from the country, remain concerned about reported abuses by Nigerian security services, and about the government's limited efforts to address perceived impunity for such abuses.

For their part, Nigerian officials reportedly remain wary of perceived U.S. interference in internal affairs and dismissive of certain training offers. These factors appear to have constrained

security cooperation, despite shared concerns over terrorism and other regional security threats. Despite concerns about Nigeria's counterterrorism approach to date, the Obama Administration has committed, through a formal dialogue mechanism known as the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), initiated in 2010, to support Nigerian efforts to increase public confidence in the military and police to respond more effectively to the extremist threat.⁴⁹ In addition to USAID programs to counter radicalization in Nigeria, the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) have deliberated in recent months on how best to ensure a shift by Nigeria to "an integrated civilian-security-focused strategy to counter Boko Haram and Ansaru in a manner that adheres to the rule of law and ensures accountability." Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield has urged the Nigerian government to take a more "holistic" approach to terrorism, suggesting that regional and socioeconomic disparities have contributed to Boko Haram recruitment. She suggests that the Nigerian response should incorporate efforts not only to degrade the group's capacity, but also to provide justice and ensure accountability "in instances where government officials and security forces violate those [human] rights," in part to "diminish Boko Haram's appeal and legitimacy"

CHAPTER FOUR

Insurgencies and Nigeria Foreign Policy

4.1 Historical perspectives to insurgency groups in Nigeria

Kidnapping and insurgency in Nigeria was unknown in the early years of Nigeria's independence in 1960. It became rampant in the late 90's and further culminating in today's epidemic proportion. Taking a cursory look at kidnapping and terrorism it forestall that it reflects a breakdown in law and order in society. It is a sign that formal authority is ineffectual and that checks and balances in governance are not working since little or no prosecution of cases abound. The kidnapper and insurgents grows their trade on the assumption that there is no justice and equality provided by organization of society as to encourage people to work and conscientiously earn a decent living. They see one man's wealth as belonging to all but only appropriated by the more powerful. In that light they arm to become powerful in order to join the loot. Where there is proper education and civic orientation perhaps this impression could be changed but not in Nigeria at the moment where money is held too high surpassing every other virtue in the pursuit of survival.

By the late 1990s a volatile atmosphere characterized by protests, agitations and conflicts. According to Azigbo (2008:18), the restiveness which started on a mild not as pockets of peaceful demonstrations to the offices of multinational oil companies by community development committees of various host communities, soon degenerated into lock-ins and seizures of oil installations. By 1998, the Niger Delta region had become “a lawless zone, where youths disrupted oil production activities and communities frequently engaged with little provocation, in destructive inter-and intra-community strife (NDDC, 2004).”

The crises in the Niger Delta manifests in various ways namely, militancy, hostage taking and kidnapping of oil workers and frequent disruption of oil production activities through the destruction of oil and gas installations and facilities.

Prominent among the militant groups operating in the region are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the Niger Delta Vigilante force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, the Bush Boys, the Martyrs Brigade among others. These militant groups have carried out deadly and paralyzing attacks on oil and gas facilities with their weapons. For instance, on March 16, 2003, Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Nigeria's biggest oil producing company, evacuated non-essential staff from its facilities in Warri, Delta State, and shut down oil production, following a month of mounting unrest by ethnic Ijaw militant groups that culminated in an attack on the Nigerian Navy on the Escravos River that left seven people dead, several soldiers wounded, and significantly disrupted riverine travel. Subsequently attacks by militants killed one Chevron contract worker and five TotalFinalElf (IFE) personnel, while gunfire badly damaged a shell helicopter seeking to evacuate employees (Cesarz, Morrison and Cooke, 2003:1). On July 12, 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) combatants killed four naval personnel and injured three soldiers who were escorting a Chevron oil tanker along Chomoni creeks in the Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State (The Punch, July 13, 2006). On the eve of the Governorship and House of Assembly elections on April 14, 2007, armed militants attacked the Mini-Okoro, Elenwo Police Stations, killing many police officers during the attack.

The Boko Haram at its inception was more of a religious movement founded by Muhammad Yusuf apparently of Kanuri extraction and with some level of western education. Because of the

grinding poverty and unemployment of the youth, he attracted some followership to himself and it seems in the competition for power by politicians, his services were sought but after electoral victory, he and his movement were discarded and security forces were unleashed on him before he was killed in police custody. His death was a signal for widespread revolt which is now led by certain Abubakar Shekau who may be in the pay of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and with possible link with the Somali Al-shabab. What is significant now is the apparent foreign involvement in what is going on. Compared with the Islamic revolutions of the western and eastern Sudan, Boko Haram and Maitasine movement can hardly be said to be Islamic movements. Boko Haram seems now to be rooted in local grievances against constituted authority and its followership is the army of the unemployed and uneducated and those with smattering knowledge of the Holy Quran and with the possible sponsorship of aggrieved politicians and the enemies of Nigeria both inside and outside the country.

4.2 Insurgency groups; Causes and reasons for the rise

Unlike northern Mali or Somalia, where jihadist armed groups have taken over remote areas in recent years, Nigeria is far from a small or weak state. It's rapidly growing and recently rebased economy is now easily the largest in Africa, providing a nominal per capita income well within the lower middle income bracket and federal government revenue forecasts of \$46 billion for 2014. It has over 100,000 troops (of variable training, equipment and experience), some 400,000 police and technological capacities that include a Space Program with four satellites. Its efforts to counter the threats posed by Boko Haram are failing not because of a lack of national resources but because of how these state resources are deployed.

First, the Muslim north of Nigeria feels chronically marginalised by the Nigerian political and economic system that has concentrated wealth in the oil-producing southeast and industrial southwest. Northern Nigeria is three times poorer than the mainly Christian south, and the northeastern heartland of Boko Haram is the poorest part of the north. Such inequalities have accelerated during the last decade of rapid national growth. Environmental change, including desertification and the disappearance of Lake Chad, is having a devastating impact on Borno and Yobe states. Unlike most other developing countries, Nigeria's fertility rate is static or increasing; population growth is highest in the north.

Economic marginalisation has been exacerbated by the perception of Christian political dominance since the 1999 transition. Whereas at least half of Nigeria's population is Muslim and military governments over the previous two decades were dominated by northern generals, all but three of the last 15 years have been under a Christian president. Muslim president Umaru Yar'Adua (2007-10) died three years into his term and was widely seen as a proxy of his southern predecessor. Current President Goodluck Jonathan is a southern Christian who inherited a presidency that most northerners saw as rightfully theirs until at least 2015. That the ruling People's Democratic Party selected him, rather than a northerner, as its candidate in 2011 is often linked to the intensification of Boko Haram's insurgency that year.

Second, Boko Haram is unlike most other challengers to the Nigerian state, such as militants in the Niger Delta, in that it is ideological and not easily bought off with oil money. It may be that some of its combatants have been lured by money, but the Salafist commitment of its leaders is real. Aside from seeking retribution for the murder of their founder, Yusuf, the group has a strong commitment to overturning the corrupt basis of Nigerian political and social life. Over centuries, political reform movements in northern Nigeria and the wider Sahel have only arrived

through Islamic revivalist movements. Given the extreme corruption of Nigerian politics and the under-development of the northeast, this stance gives Boko Haram credibility among many disaffected youths. Unusually, the group is far more interested in national issues than global jihad or the al-Qaida brand.

Third, the at times brutal and incompetent nature of the counter-insurgency operation conducted by the state's Joint Task Force (JTF) has hardened opposition to the government in many quarters. Army and police are frequently accused of deserting communities under attack or failing to respond to alerts. The army has committed extra-judicial executions of suspected militants and attacked communities suspected of harbouring them. The security forces are perceived to enjoy impunity, including for Yusuf's murder. Reports suggest they harbour Islamist sympathisers and some officers sell the identities of their local informants to Boko Haram. Conspiracy theorists argue that the armed forces benefit from bonuses, promotions and equipment as the war escalates.

4.3 Indices and cases of reported activities of insurgency groups in Nigeria

While a radical dissident faction led by Abubakar Shekau launched several attacks around Borno and Yobe states in 2003-04, Boko Haram did not switch from proselytization to combat until 2009. An uprising in Borno state in July was put down with maximum force and Yusuf was arrested and killed in custody. Boko Haram then went underground, re-emerging under Shekau's leadership in mid-2010. Attacks have subsequently been staged in at least 12 of Nigeria's 36 states, as well as Abuja, the federal capital. Targets have included security forces, administration buildings, politicians, informants, foreign workers, moderate Imams, churches, bars and increasingly schools. Most casualties have been Muslim civilians. After Shekau rejected a

possible amnesty the federal government declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states on 14 May 2013.

Casualty figures recorded by Nigeria Watch, an Ibadan-based casualty recording project, demonstrate an insurgency that has been stoked rather than countered in the last year. About 9,000 casualties have been recorded since July 2009, of which over 5,000 since the state of emergency was imposed. 1,043 were recorded killed in March 2014 alone, with over 700 in April. These rates are comparable to the current conflict in Iraq. They may well be underestimates since the domestic press sources that Nigeria Watch relies upon have had restricted access to the three focal states since May 2013.

Rather than being displaced, Boko Haram's activity has become more concentrated in the Kanuri-speaking northeast, especially Borno state and the well garrisoned city of Maiduguri. The extent of this 'battlefield' is about 75,000 km², the size of Ireland or Scotland. According to the National Emergency Management Agency, a quarter-million people have been displaced from this area so far in 2014 and half the north-east's 12 million people are directly affected by violence. The UN High Commission for Refugees estimates nearer half-a-million displaced and predicts a food crisis. Hundreds of schools and clinics are closed. There have been few attacks or clashes over the last year in the rest of northern Nigeria but a number of high profile attacks have been staged around Abuja since March, suggesting a well-entrenched Boko Haram cell operates there.

The nature of attacks attributed to Boko Haram suggests that the group has grown rapidly in confidence, capability and coordination. In attacks in December and March Boko Haram units

massed several hundred combatants in Maiduguri to attack the main air force and army bases. On 14 April, the group detonated a car bomb in Abuja's main bus station and kidnapped some 276 girls from Chibok school in southern Borno. In several cases it is reported to have moved columns of dozens of conspicuous armed vehicles along Borno's main highways without interdiction. Indeed, despite the reinforced state security presence, Boko Haram is regularly reported as controlling large areas of Borno and its borders with Niger and Cameroon.

Boko Haram Timeline Attacks

More than 480 perpetrator groups committed terrorist attacks during the time period that Boko Haram has been active. From 2009-2013, Boko Haram was responsible for 2.34 percent of more than 34,000 terrorist attacks that took place worldwide. Additionally, Boko Haram was responsible for 5.9 percent of fatalities from terrorist attacks during this same period. The group is now among the deadliest in the world.

Most Lethal Perpetrator Groups (2009-2013)	# of Attacks	# of Fatalities
Taliban	2328	7348
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	761	3804
Boko Haram	801	3666
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq	786	3417
Al-Shabaab	837	2149

Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	467	1939
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	1356	1660
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	139	1436
Al-Nusrah Front	66	1010
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	68	829

Source: Global Terrorism Database

Date	Reported Attack
7 September 2010	Bauchi prison break
31 December 2010	December 2010 Abuja attack
12 March 2011	Assassinated Muslim Cleric Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi for criticizing the violent groups in northeast Nigeria
22 April 2011	Boko Haram frees 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State

29 May 2011	May 2011 northern Nigeria bombings
16 June 2011	The group claims responsibility for the 2011 Abuja police headquarters bombing
26 June 2011	Bombing attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri, leaving 25 dead and 12 injured
10 July 2011	Bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State
11 July 2011	The University of Maiduguri temporarily closes down its campus citing security concerns
12 August 2011	Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana is shot dead by Boko Harām.
26 August 2011	2011 Abuja bombing
4 November 2011	2011 Damaturu attacks
25 December 2011	December 2011 Nigeria bombings
5–6 January 2012	January 2012 Nigeria attacks
20 January 2012	January 2012 Kano bombings
28 January 2012	Nigerian army says it killed 11 Boko Harām insurgents
8 February 2012	Boko Harām claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna.
16 February 2012	Another prison break staged in central Nigeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed.

8 March 2012	During a British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher McManus, abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Haram, both hostages were killed.
31 May 2012	During a Joint Task Force raid on a Boko Haram den, it was reported that 5 sect members and a German hostage were killed.
3 June 2012	15 church-goers were killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi state. Boku Harām claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa.
17 June 2012	Suicide bombers strike three churches in Kaduna. At least 50 people were killed.
17 June 2012	130 bodies were found in Plateau State. It is presumed they were killed by Boko Haram terrorists.
18 September 2012	Family of four murdered
18 September 2012	Murder of six at an outdoor party
19 September 2012	Nigerian Military arrests Boko Haram militants, reported death of Abu Qaqa
3 October 2012	Around 25–46 people were massacred in the town of Mubi in Nigeria during a night-time raid.
18 March 2013	2013 Kano Bus bombing: At least 22 killed and 65 injured, when a suicide car bomb exploded in Kano bus station.
19 April 2013	Deadliest attack since 2009: gun battle with security forces leaves 260 dead and nearly 1000 injured

7 May 2013	At least 55 killed and 105 inmates freed in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town.
6 July 2013	Yobe State school shooting: 42 people, mostly students, were killed in a school attack in northeast Nigeria.
11 August 2013	44 people killed in a mosque in Konduga.
29 September 2013	College of Agriculture in Gujba: 40 male students killed.
20 October 2013	4 motorists killed in northeastern Nigeria.
2 December 2013	Hundreds of fighters attacked a military base in Maiduguri.
14 January 2014	At least 31 people killed, over 50 people injured by suicide bombing in Maiduguri, Borno State.
26 January 2014	At least 45 people killed in the village of Kawuri.
11 February 2014	23 people killed in Konduga.
16 February 2014	Izghe massacre: 106 killed.
25 February 2014	Federal Government College attack: Fury at military over Yobe deaths. At least 29 teenage boys dead at Federal Government College Buni Yadi.[69]
14 March 2014	Attack on the military barracks in Maiduguri, nearly 600 detainees freed. The latters were executed when government forces retook control.
14 April 2014	2014 Chibok kidnapping: Government properties, including the only girls' secondary school, attacked. At least 16 killed or missing, and 234 female

	students kidnapped. The Boko Haram militants said it would treat them as slaves as part of the "war booty".
14 April 2014	April 2014 Abuja bombing: Two bombs explode at a crowded bus station in Abuja, Nigeria, killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200.
1 May 2014	A car bomb exploded killing at least 19 people and injured at least 60 in the same area of Abuja as the April bomb.
5 May 2014	2014 Gamburu attack: Boko Haram attacked the twin towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State, Nigeria. They started shooting in a busy marketplace, set houses on fire, and gunned down anyone who tried to flee. The death toll of the massacre has been set as high as 336.
13 May 2014	Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa: Boko Haram attacked three villages, killing around 60 people in Menari. Vigilantes fought back, killing over 200 Boko Haram militants.
17 May 2014	Paris summit: A summit in Paris has declared Boko Haram is part of al-Qaeda as leaders from West African nations resolved to mount a region-wide offensive against the group that is holding more than 200 schoolgirls hostage in a dense jungle. Western nations have pledged to provide technical expertise and training to the new regional African effort against the Islamic extremists.
18 May 2014	Kano: Suicide car bomb kills five people.
20 May 2014	Jos: Twin bomb explosions kill 118 people.

30 May 2014	Assassination of Muslim leader Alhaji Idrissa Timta the Emir of Gwoza in Borno.
1 June 2014	Mubi bombing: An attack at a football field in Mubi, Adamawa kills at least 40 people
2 June 2014	Militants dressed as soldiers slaughtered at least 200 civilians in three communities in Gwoza. A community leader who witnessed the killings said that local residents had pleaded for help from the military, but it did not arrive in time. It took a few days for word from survivors to reach the provincial capital of Maiduguri, because the roads are extremely dangerous and phone connections are poor or nonexistent. The slaughter was confirmed by both Mohammed Ali Ndume, a senator representing Borno and whose hometown is Gwoza, and by a top security official in Maiduguri who insisted on anonymity.
29 May - June 5 2014	6 attacks, killing 506 civilians, 5 military; 20 women and 3 men abducted. 60 Boko Haram killed by Cameroon's military
June 6 - June 12 2014	4 attacks, killing 5 civilians, 6 military; military kill 50 Boko Haram
June 13 - June 19 2014	2 attacks, 46 civilians killed; 8 Boko Haram killed by Borno vigilante group
June 20 - June 26 2014	4 attacks, 93 civilians killed, 60 abducted. A military fighter jet bombed unknown number of Boko Haram in counterattack; 25 Boko Haram and 16 soldiers killed in attack on military base. Cameroon military killed 10 Boko Haram near border

June 27 - July 3 2014	2 attacks, 112 killed
July 4 - July 10 2014	4 Boko Haram attacks, 11 civilians, 1 vigilante, 33 soldiers, 4 police killed. 53 Boko Haram were killed while capturing a military base and police station in Borno on the 4th of July. On the 6th, soldiers killed a Boko Haram kingpin and his brother at their home in Kaduna; also on the 6th, 44 Boko Haram were killed in 2 military operations in Borno
July 11 - July 17 2014	4 attacks, 81 civilians killed, many of these shot by fighter jet in a failed counter-attack. German teacher kidnapped and 2 vigilantes killed on July 16 in Adamawa, presumably by Boko Haram
July 25 - July 27 2014	2 attacks in Kolofata, Cameroon, including the kidnapping of the wife of the Vice Prime Minister, Amadou Ali, as well as local religious leader and mayor, Seini Boukar-Lamine.
11 August 2014 2014	28 civilians killed, 97 kidnapped, all men and boys, in attacks on villages in Borno State in rural northeast Nigeria. Many homes torched in the raid

Compiled By Author 2014

4.4 Nigeria Response to Insurgency Attacks

The authority in Nigeria seems to be relaxed when the issue of insurgency groups and terrorism was first uncovered, although this trend is relatively new and strange in the country. The effect (collateral damage) of terrorism was only seen in foreign countries and the ability of their media to beam live footage of this development to other part of the world, is a wakeup call for countries preparedness against future strike by terrorists and this phenomenon can happen in areas that

have not been known to be a terrorists operating zones. For every deadly act committed by terrorists in these countries, it enables the country to take decisive or proactive measures in stopping and reducing the vulnerability of the terrorism, the act can be repeated at a different interval. The global campaign against terrorism is the collective responsibility of peace loving and civilised nations to unite and fight terrorism; this effort is spread across continents and the readiness of countries to adopt a common ground is needed. Nigeria has had its fair share of terrorists aggression from 1999-2012, the inability of the authority to rise to its feet in combating terrorism has placed the country in a dangerous position. The decision taken by authority is rather too slow to really challenge the scourge of domestic terrorism in the country. During the civilian administration of Chief Obasanjo, proactive measures are taken to fight back terrorism, for example the Odi and Zaki Biam response by the government is a clear indication of its willingness to fight terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria. But the present political leadership seems to lack the will to combat terrorism despite the presence of well effective intelligent networking and structures put in place to counter terrorism from all indication, has raises questions on the sincerity of the government in handling terrorism. Every month many innocents Nigerians have lost their lives through terrorist strikes. These unexpected events have made many Nigerians to have no confidence in the authority's effort in the fight against terrorism. It is seemingly right for Nigerians to protest the government in ability to bring to an end to terrorism of the perpetual fear of being a possible target of terrorist attack.

Likewise the government is also not sleeping in its effort to address the situation but rather it needed a concerted effort for all meaningful and reasonable Nigerians to achieve its aim of reducing the threat of terrorism. But this situation is increasingly dangerous and is consuming much time, despite the fact that the Nigerian authorities have discovered and known the terrorists

and their major sponsors within and outside Nigeria. Even if the United States has done little to help Nigeria out of its severe economic and political issues, which are claimed to be indirectly responsible for much of the tension in the country. Nigeria should not put in much weight on Washington and other superpowers to actively support current economic and political reforms, but be prepared to take the lead in the fight against domestic terrorism and addressing Nigeria's myriad of problems."

4.5 Nigeria Foreign Relations and Boko Haram Insurgency

The Boko Haram without any shadow of doubt is linked to Al-Qaeda. Armed with the mission to subvert democracy in Nigeria, the sect started to unleash terror on Nigerians beginning with July 26, 2009 which was the first clash with security agencies in Bauchi state after an all night attack on Dutsen- Tanshi Police station in which 39 members, 2 policemen and one soldier were killed. Terrorist attacks through Boko Haram have much impact on foreign countries' policy and foreign relations. Many Nigerian nationals and foreign nationals had lost their lives due to the attack of this sect. The sect has added another dimension to its attack which is the bombing of strategic areas.

The Federal Capital City, Abuja had a taste of this bombing by October 1 2010. This was followed by the bomb blast that occurred at Louis Edet House, Headquarters of the Nigerian Police. In a similar occurrence, there was the Mogadishu Barracks Bomb blast and to climax it all, there was the United Nations Office bombing that took the lives of at least 23 persons. Also recently, a British hostage Chris McManus and his Italian counterpart, Franco Lamolinara were killed by the Nigerian terrorists. The latter event prompted President Goodluck Jonathan to formally write to both the Prime Ministers of Britain and Italy, David Cameron and Mario to

express sympathy with them on the death of these nationals. Touched by the monumental destructions of the Boko Haram, the Nigerian Government had decided to tackle the activities of Boko- Haram through bilateral and multilateral relations.

On Tuesday February 28, 2012, the Nigerian Government and the republic of Cameroon signed an agreement of Trans-border security team with Cameroon. Sources disclosed that the pact was part of the measures to curb the surge in the activities of Boko Haram. The sources added that the text of the agreement between the two countries would fight terrorism jointly³². The Nigeria foreign affairs Minister, Ambassador Olusegun Ashiru stated that Nigeria was committed to the pact, full implementation, and realization of its objectives in the interest of progress, peace and security of the people of the two countries believing that Cameroon would also demonstrate the same commitment³³. Speaking on the pact, Alhaji Amadou Ali of Cameroun said the agreement showed that confidence had been restored through permanent dialogue, consultation and reinforcement of cooperation between both countries. In another related development, Nigeria and Niger Republic signed an agreement for the immediate commencement of joint border patrols along the borders between the two neighbouring countries to curb the activities of the Islamic Religious sect, Boko Haram. The agreement was signed in Niamey the capital of Niger Republic³⁴. Similarly another bilateral agreement existed between Nigeria and Britain. The British foreign Secretary, Mr Williams Hague pledged the assistance of Britain to Nigeria to fight the terrorist attacks following the bombing of United Nations (UN) headquarters at Abuja. In his words “The UK stands ready to provide any assistance we can to the UN and Nigerian authorities to bring those responsible to justice Other countries of the world that had bilateral relations with Nigeria on the menace of Boko Haram include Italy, Germany and Israel. Italy government had offered to provide security services to the federal government. A special envoy

of the Italian Minister of foreign Affairs, Hon. Margherita Boniver while meeting with the Deputy Senate President Ike Ekweremadu stated that Italy would strengthen bilateral relations with Nigeria to help tackle terrorism, human trafficking and poverty. In the same vein, President Jonathan had equally called on German government to deploy German technology to track down the terror group. The state of Israel had also pledged to Nigeria to combat the terrorist group. This was disclosed by Israel's Ambassador to Nigeria, Moshe Ram.

At the multilateral level, President Jonathan attended an international conference in the United Kingdom in which some members of the international communities debated measures and steps to be effectively adopted to check the unprecedented growth of terrorism and violence in some African nations like Somalia and Nigeria. At the sub-regional level members of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) unanimously agreed at waging a relentless war against terrorists who migrate from neighbouring nations to launch attack on Nigerian soil. Two countries of this community (ECOWAS) recently reiterated this support for the country. Worried by the continued disturbance of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, the World Council of Churches (WCC) from Geneva and the Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (RAABIT) from Jordan, with many religious leaders from many parts of the world. These bodies arrived at Abuja on May 22, 2012 with the aim of finding solution to the Boko Haram menace. The delegation visited different places including Kaduna and Jos, and in concluding their tour, the body stated that:

“We now need to digest what we have seen, heard, and experienced, and we are committed to writing a detailed report of our experience within the

coming month. In this, we will make some recommendations as well as specific suggestions relating to our continued commitment to the welfare of Nigeria and Nigerian people”

4.6 Implication of Boko haram insurgency on Nigeria foreign policy

Following the attempt by Two US lawmakers, Peter King and Patrick Meehan, in April 2012 that Boko Haram should be labelled a terrorist group due to its growing threat, scholars argued that Nigeria would be regarded as “a terrorist state and another axis of the devil.” as the international community will perceived that the country could no longer checkmate the sect. Nigerians will be subjected to more inhuman treatment overseas and every Nigerian will be a ‘suspect’. This will in the long run discourage foreign investment because the country’s credibility before the international community will be seriously questioned. The skyrocketing effect will be felt at international airports and on foreign trade. The spate of insecurity built the worrisome trend, which will massively affect the image of the country.

History shows that violence in Africa rarely raises eyebrows in the West, but the increasing influence of radical Islam in Nigeria has the international community on edge. One point of particular concern is a UN report indicating Boko Haram’s ties with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The report outlines the arrest of seven Boko Haram members traveling through Niger to Mali in possession of known al Qaeda member’s contact information. Though it’s clear that any coordination between Boko Haram may have with AQIM is advancing day by day, communication between the terror groups certainly spells trouble for Africa and may help explain the increase in violence, the terror franchise has a vested interest in seeing Nigeria fail as

a state and becoming a terror safe-haven à la Shabaab in Somalia. From there, Nigeria's geographic position would make all of North Africa susceptible to Islamic insurgencies itching to battle ill-equipped governments.

Nigeria started 2014 ready to celebrate becoming Africa's largest economy, albeit by updating (rebasings) the standard measure of economic size, GDP. Unfortunately, the festivities were short-lived. In the ensuing months, the rapidly escalating Boko Haram insurgency exposed to all the country's many weaknesses and deep dysfunction that had been partially obscured in recent years by surging oil revenues. While seemingly separate events, the announcement of Nigeria's newly acquired economic status and the stepped-up insurgency are intimately related. In as much as the former is a good news for the country to negotiate diplomatic activities in a position of strength, the latter has deemed the celebration of Nigeria been the largest economy in Africa as such the country is still back to square one in its foreign policy relations.

The increasingly audacious Boko Haram insurgents have been proving too strong for the country's military and other security personnel to handle. For instance, while Nigerian forces were engaged in a fierce battle to recapture Damboa town, which was captured by the insurgents in August 2014, some media reports said the insurgents have also overrun Gwoza community and reportedly slaughtered many civilians while the whereabouts of the emir remains unknown. In the modern world's largely morality-free international politics and hypocritical diplomacy, hopeful and ambitious countries exploit whatever resources, potentials or advantages they have, be it economic, political, geographical, demographical etc., to pursue their interests and achieve their strategic goals. This does not spell anything good for Nigeria in the international community as countries who may well want to assist Nigeria to fight the insurgent may well be doing it to promote its interest. This is seen in the involvement of the United States plan to assist

Nigeria to rescue to kidnapped Chibok Girls ending in a fiasco as the intelligence gathering assistance they later pledged to provide has turned out to be much below expectation, having probably realized that the crisis does not pose any serious threat to their economic and other strategic interests in the country and the West African sub-region, at least for now and perhaps for the foreseeable future. This explains the apparent failure of the purported intelligence assistance they are ostensibly giving to Nigeria in its struggle to contain the crisis.

Nigeria typically supplies almost half of the Sahel's cereal needs. As a result of the conflict in the north, production is down and prices have spiked causing serious food security concerns in the Sahel, particularly import-dependent, Niger. Isolation, furthermore, undercuts developmental prospects. This is poignantly seen in the global campaign to eradicate polio. Northern Nigeria is one of three locations in the world today where the polio virus persists (Pakistan and Afghanistan being the others). Inaccessibility to the northern region as well as misinformation regarding the purpose of vaccination campaigns risk derailing the latest drive to eradicate the disease – and free up billions of dollars in resources for other public health initiatives around the world.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion

5.1 Summary

This study has examined the activities of Boko Haram and how their quest for global recognition and expansionist tendency has brought them to collaborate with other international terrorist groups. The study went further to by attempting to explain the driving forces behind the Boko Haram phenomenon.

The study also juxtaposed Nigeria foreign policy and Boko Haram. The position of the study however is that the insurgency group has brought Nigeria to the fore in relation to terrorist attack in the international arena and has gravely impacted the external relations of the country.

In any case, it is clear that Boko Haram has metamorphosed from a strictly religious movement to one espousing a political agenda.

Is of no doubt that different set of militants group have emerged in Nigeria with Boko Haram leading the prawn. It has been established that insurgence of Boko Haram have posed serious challenges to this Nation which have been briefly highlighted without neglecting factors that instigate militancy insurgency in Nigeria which latter concludes with recommendations towards avoidance of future militancy insurgency. It could be recalled that the main drive behind formation of all this ethnic militant are social injustice, marginalisation, neglect, deprivation and seeming insecurity for the people.

No wonder O. O Ehiede (2007: 273) stated that the militia groups in the Niger Delta emerged as a result of the peculiar problems in the Niger Delta among whom is environmental degradation

and alleged political insensitivity of the state while the OPC sprang up as a consequence of the annulment of the 12th June 1993 presidential election won by Chief M. K. O. Abiola, a Yoruba.

The author stated further thus:

we can see that the fears and demands of the ethnic militia groups have basically revolved around the issues of the national question: marginalisation and domination of one group by another . . . the concern of MASSOP is the marginalisation of the East in the power equation in Nigeria; that of OPC is about “power shift,” and restructuring of the Nigerian federation and the quest for self-determination by groups in the Niger Delta region is based on the social justice, neglect and marginalization that the area suffers in the Nigerian nation.

It is the belief of this present writer that in a deeper scrutiny by analytical mind; mine inclusive, there is a clear different between rat and rabbit no matter their similarity. Therefore there is a clear different between Boko Haram and their cause as well as Islam; the fact is speaking for itself.

Corroborating this, the Nation NewsStudy (2013: 5) reported thus: even though the group started out as a purely Islamic group, the disposition of the group became questionable for three reasons. Firstly, the sect is not only out for non-Muslims, it is fighting the government as well. This is evident in the group’s bombings of the United Nation (UN) House in Abuja and other government owned structures. Secondly, recent Boko Haram news showed that the sect has non-Muslims as its members.

Thirdly, the group has not spared some prominent Muslims, as they had attacked mosques and killed Islamic religious leaders in the past. And we can conclude that Boko Haram were have early been used by some Northern Politicians as a political militia but the group subsequently

move out of their control and constitute threat to the whole Nigeria. No wonder Ambassador Yusuf Mamman (Vanguard NewsStudy, 2011) stated that you cannot separate politicians from this because whether bombings were done by militants of the Niger Delta or Boko Haram or any armed group in Nigeria, politicians have a hand in it. Many armed groups are sponsored by politicians.

The Study assesses Nigeria foreign policy in the face of Boko Haram insurgency group and summed that the nation's diplomats may be at the crossroad considering the need to design the core aspects of any nation's foreign policy, the national interests; this involves so many actors that need to unify on the needs and wants of the country. Deciding on this aspect comes with numerous challenges that will trigger the necessary shift from idealistic policies that does not align with our economic agenda to aggressively pursue of our ambitions such as our foreign direct investment goals.

5.2 Recommendations

While commonly perceived as solely a domestic problem, the threat posed by Boko Haram has important multinational origins, drivers, and implications. Accordingly, it is important that both the Nigerian government and external partners make a priority of keeping links between northern Nigeria and the outside world open. Ultimately, this is a battle for the trust of the local population. Communications is a central element of the stabilization equation. External engagement can accelerate the government's learning on this front as well as the broader question of how to confront a dangerous domestic adversary with restraint and sensitivity for civilian casualties. Comparable challenges are being faced in contexts from the Sahel, the

Maghreb, and East Africa, to Latin America and East Asia. No one country has all the answers. Yet, opening channels of information-sharing with legitimate actors in these contexts can help avoid some of the most costly mistakes. Enhanced regional security cooperation, particularly with Nigeria's northern neighbors – Chad, Niger, and Cameroon – is of particular priority given the regional elements of the militant threat. The challenges posed by Boko Haram are emblematic of an emerging security paradigm in Africa today where local grievances are fused with international ideology, funding, and technology. Effectively addressing the multilayers of this threat will require the cooperative engagement of Nigeria's neighbors and international partners.

Boko Haram is unlike most other challengers to the Nigerian state, such as militants in the Niger Delta, in that it is ideological and not easily bought off with oil money. It may be that some of its combatants have been lured by money, but the Salafist commitment of its leaders is real. Aside from seeking retribution for the murder of their founder, Yusuf, the group has a strong commitment to overturning the corrupt basis of Nigerian political and social life. Over centuries, political reform movements in northern Nigeria and the wider Sahel have only arrived through Islamic revivalist movements. Given the extreme corruption of Nigerian politics and the underdevelopment of the northeast, this stance gives Boko Haram credibility among many disaffected youths. Unusually, the group is far more interested in national issues than global jihad or the al-Qaida brand hence the government of the day should promote even development and a significant reduction in systemic corruption.

To some scholars it is argued that “Nigeria barely needs a foreign policy. Her neighbours are all weak and have no desire or capacity to threaten Nigeria in any serious ways. There is, then, no need for Nigeria to develop any foreign policy because of her geographic or strategic position,

and because of external menaces or power distribution between the country and its neighbours”. (Ofoegbu, 1975) the contention is excessively simplistic. But the civil War drove home the point that a foreign policy of benign neglect towards the less powerful neighbours on the part of a regional “giant” is now not without costs. When, for instance, president Zinsou of Dahomey (now Bénin Republic) permitted the International Red Cross in early 1969 to use Cotonou as a base from which to fly relief materials to „Biafra“ the importance of living good relations with ones neighbours was driven home to the Gowon administration. Successive government should learn from this and fashion a strong good neighbourliness with other Africa countries, a systematic civilization of good and close relations with her distant neighbours in West Africa should characterized the foreign policy of successive government in Nigeria.

The U.S. Intelligence Community must increase its intelligence collection on Boko Haram, including human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). It must also enhance its liaison relationship with Nigerian security services and help build their capacity to combat the threat posed by Boko Haram to Nigerian and U.S. interests. This should ultimately be done with complete respect for the sovereignty of Nigeria.

Bibliography

Books

Adesoji, A. 2010. The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 45(2), 95-108.

Agbu, O. (2004), Globalization and International Terrorism: The Challenges for Nigeria's Foreign Policy. In B. A. Akinterinwa (Ed). *Nigeria's New Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniyi*. Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, pp. 323-339.

Akwen, G.T. (2011), *Theories of International Relations*. Lap: Lambert Academic Publisher

Bamgbose J. Adele, *Nigeria's Foreign Policy* Olu-Akin Publishers, 2007.

Fawole Alade, *Paranoia, Hostility, and Defiance Gen Sani Abacha and the „new“ Nigeria Foreign Policy* Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 1999.

Jennifer, C. (2011), *Hearing on Boko Haram*. Ibadan: Favour Publication

Schelling, T. C. (1966), *Arms and Influence*, New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

Slann, M. (1998). *Introduction to Politics. Governments and Nations in Post-Cold War Era*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Journals

Abimbola, J.O & Adesote S.A. 2011. Terrorism and National Security in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria. *National Security and Resource Management in Nigeria*. Babatolu, J. S(Ed) School of Arts and Social Sciences, Adeyemi College of Education. Ondo.

Adekanye, J.B, "Terrorism and Globalization: How should the International Community Respond? An African Perspective African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies Vol.1. No1.1.

Adeniran, T. 1996. Terrorism and National Security. Staff Seminar Series. Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.

Adesote, S.A.2010. Government Response to Niger Delta Agitation. A Study Presented at Postgraduate Class on His 709, Department of History, University of Ibadan

Akinyemi Bolaji A. "Reciprocity in Nigerian Foreign Policy" (The Akinyemi Doctrine) Nigerian Forum, May-June 1987, Nos 6&5

Alao, David Oladimeji, Atere Clement Olusegun- Boko-Haram Insurgence In Nigeria: The Challenges And Lessons |Singaporean Journal Of Business Economics, And Management Studies Vol.1, No.4, 2012

Alhaji (Dr) Sule Lamido,- Challenges Of Foreign Policy Making And Implementation In Nigeria: An Insider's Perspective| Lecture Presented Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA) in Collaboration with Friedrich Elbert Stiftung (FES) Nigeria at Protea Hotel, Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria, on 31st October, 2012.

Ampatuam, T. P. (2003), Terrorism and Nation – State Institutions: Actions and Inter-actions. Retrieved on March 16, 2009 from www.pvtr.org/pdf/GlobalAnalysis/Nation-States%20institutions.pdf

Asma Jahangir and Fateh Azzam, "Human Rights," in Towards a Democratic Response: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, vol. III (2005), p. 29, <http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-3.pdf>

Babatunde S. Emmanuel- NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT 50:
The Making of a World Institute in Africa. ISBN: 978-002-094-3 NIIA (2011)

Bagaji A.Y.S et al, 2012. Boko Haram and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to
Impose Religious Ideology through Terrorism?Cross-cultural Communication Vol. 8, No. 1, pp.
33-41

Balogun, E. O. O, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Linkage Politics" Journal of Arts and Social
Sciences Vol. 5 October/November 2000 pp. 89-93.

Bartolotta, C. (2011). Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram. The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations, 5(1), pp. 44-57.

Danjibo, N.D. 2009. Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and
'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies Study Series, Institute of
African Studies, University of Ibadan, 1-21

Dearn Mark, 2011. Boko Haram Nigeria's Terrorists Insurgency Evolves In Codewit World
News, Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe, 2008. Civil Society and the UN Global
Counter- Terrorism Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges. New York: Center on Global
Counterterrorism Cooperation

Eme, O.I. and Ibietan, J. (2012). The Cost of Boko Haram Activities in Nigeria. AJMBR Vol.
2(2). Pp. 10-32.

Eme, O.I., et. al. (2012). Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria. AJBMR,
1(9), pp. 77 99.

George A. Obiozor- Nigeria's Foreign Policy in Perspective- ISBN: 978-2049-17-14 NIIA (1992)

Hutchful, E. (2001). Security, Law and Order. Journal of Africa Development, Senegal: Codesria.

Kevin Shillington (2005). Encyclopedia of African History. Michigan University Press. p. 1401. ISBN 1-57958-455-1

Mazrui, Ali (2002), Shariacracy and Federal Models in the Era of Globalizations: Nigeria in Comparative Perspective, In Edward R, Mahon M.C., and Thomas A.P. Sinclair's (eds). Democratic Institution Performance Research and Policy Perspective. Westport, C.T. Praeger.

Nwolise, O.B.C "Terrorism: What is to be done about an emerging threat to democracy, good governance, development, and security of nations in the 21st century" .Special Research Issue Vol.1 IFRA, Ibadan 2005 pp.1-35.

Oche, O (2008). "Small Arms Proliferation and Violent Crime in Nigeria". International Journal of Peace and Conflict Management. Vol. 1, No.1. July.

Odidison Omankhanlen and Johnson Babajide, "BOKO HARAM FUNDING: Nigeria may face International Sanctions" at http://www.nncpo.netindex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=832 boko-haram-funding-nigeria-may-face-international-sanctions-&ca> (24th August 2012)

Ogaba, O "Is Al-Qaeda in Nigeria" Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Vol.32 Nos 5 and 6 May-June 2011 pp.129-142.

Ogbogbo, C.B.N. 2004. The Niger Delta and the Resource Control Conflict, 1960-1995. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis. Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan

Ojukwu, C.C, 2011. Terrorism, Foreign and Human Rights Concern in Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 13, No.4. Clarion, Pennsylvania : Clarion University of Pennsylvania,

Olatunji Olateju- Historicising Insurgencies in Contemporary Nigeria | Journal of Foreign Languages, Cultures and Civilizations 1(1); June 2013 pp. 12-22.

Omobolaji Ololade Olarinmoye, “Understanding Ethnic Militias: The Micropolitics of the Oodua People’s Congress of SouthWestern Nigeria”, Nigerian Journal of Policy and Development, Volume 5 and 6, 2006/2007

Onyema , E. 2011. Internal Security and Militancy Management in Nigeria Retrieved from www.google.com

Peter Nkanga, “Responding to terrorism in Nigeria”, available online at http://234next.com/cspcmssites/NextNews/National/5743941-146responding_to_terrorism_in_nigeria.csp accessed on 23 October 2011

Pogeson A.I. 1994., . Unpublished Ph.D Thesis. Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan

Prof. Ebere Onwudiwe in his lecture delivered during Igbinedion University Okada, Edo State 10th Anniversary lecture on 5th of May 2009.

Radin, C. J. (2012). „The threat of Boko Haram for Nigeria, Africa and beyond“. Threat matrix. A blog of the long war journal. Retrieved on 25th April, 2012 from www.longwarjournal.org/threat.../the-threat-of-boko-haram...pdf.

Rapport, D. 1984. Fear and Trembling Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions. American Political Science Review, 78 (3), 658-677.

Romm, J.J. (1993), Defining National Security: The Non Military Aspect. Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York

Shettima, A. G. (2009). „The Almajiri“s syndrome: A response to General Babangida“. Retrieved on 30th August, 2009 from www.amanaonline.com/articles/shettima/shettima_30.htm.

Thomson, V. (2012). „Boko Haram and Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria“. Global security studies, 3(3), pp. 46 – 60.

Newspaper Sources

Adiorho, I and Oyeade, W “Nigeria on roller Stakes down the slope” in The Guardian (Lagos) January 8, 2010 pp.22 and 23.

Ajibola, Bola, “Solving the Problem of Boko Haram, The Guardian,(Lagos) June 10, 2012 p.12.

Fox News explosions hit bus station in central Nigeria city". 20 May 2014. Retrieved 20 May 2014.

Jacinto, Leela (2012-01-13). "The Boko Haram terror chief who came back from the dead". France 24. Retrieved 2012-01-24.

Jonah, Adamu and Igboeroteonwu, Anamesere (20 May 2014). "Bombings kill at least 118 in Nigerian city of Jos". Reuters. Retrieved 21 May 2014.

Maclean, Ruth (3 May 2014) Nigerian school says 329 girl pupils missing The Times, (the online version may need a subscription), Retrieved 10 May 2014

Mojeed, M. & Schmitt, E. (2011). "Nigeria Arrests 2 in Blast That Killed 26 in Church". The New

Nossiter, A. (2009). "Scores Die as Fighters Battle Nigerian Police". The New York Times. [Online] Available: http://www.enotes.com/topic/Boko_Haram (10-8-2012).

Nossiter, Adam (2012-02-25). "In Nigeria, a Deadly Group's Rage Has Local Roots". The New York Times. Retrieved 2012-02-27.

Obinna, O (2011) "Boko Haram is battle for 2015". The Nation. (Sept. 29) [Online] Available: http://www.enotes.com/topic/Boko_Haram (10-8-2012)

Sanusi, L. (2010). „Sanusi dares NASS on 25% expenditure: says I stand by my statement“ Nigerian Tribune, 2nd December, 2010, pp. 1 & 4.

Suleiman, T. (2011). „Living in the shadows of Boko Haram“. Tell magazine, November 21st, 2011, p. 45.

The Guardian, Tuesday, 24 April, 2012.

The Nigerian Voice (2012), Security Heightens in Kaduna ... FG says BH Attacks Make North Economically Backward. February 9, 2012. Retrieved from www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews

Tsokar, K (2012). „Poverty level rises as economy grows, says agency“. The Guardian, Tuesday 14th February, 2012.

Umoru, H. (2012). „Boko Haram: Arrest Ciroma, Lawal, Kaita-Clark, challenges IBB to debate on his alleged senility, insists Northern leaders to speak out“. Vanguard, Thursday 9th August, 2012, pp. 1 & 5.

Usigbe, L. (2012). „Embrace Islam, or resign, Boko Haram tells Jonathan“, Nigerian Tribune, Monday 6th August 2012, p. 1.

Utebor, S. (2012). „Rogues, armed robbers in national assembly – Obasanjo“, The Punch, Wednesday 23rd June 2012, p. 2.

Weekly Trust, Saturday, 24 March, 2012.

Internet Sources

Baiyewu, L. (2012) “Boko Haram, Bad Signal to Foreign Investors, Sunday Punch, January 29, P.9.

BBC News Boko Haram Militants abduct 100+ Teenage Girls in Nigeria". IANS. news.biharprabha.com. Retrieved 15 April 2014.

BBC News The end of slavery". The Story of Africa.. Retrieved 28 May 2011.

BBC News Nigeria's 'Taliban' enigma".. 28 July 2009. [Online] Available: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/8172270.stm>. (2-8-2012)

Boko Haram strikes again in Borno, kills 4 <http://www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/16402-boko-haram-strikes-again-in-borno-kills-4> ASSESSED September 2014

Brock, Joe (2012-01-12). "Nigeria sect leader defends killings in video". Reuters Africa (Thomson Reuters). Retrieved 2012-01-24.

Bumah, J., & Abimbola, A. (2009, August 6). The Boko Haram Tragedy and Other Issues. The Punch, Lagos, 40.

'Civilians among dead in Nigeria offensive'. Al Jazeera. 31 May 2013.

Clashes between Nigerian army, Boko Haram kill 35. Reuters. Retrieved on 2013-08-14.

Claude Welch, "Civil-Military Agonies in Nigeria: Pains of an unaccomplished Transition" Armed Forces and Society, Vol.21 No.4 Summer 1995 pp. 593-614.

Collins, Matt (9 May 2014) #BringBackOurGirls: the power of a social media campaign The Guardian, Retrieved 11 May 2014

Cook, D. (2011). "The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria", Combating Terrorism Centre. Retrieved 08-10-2013.

York Times. Dec. 26 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/world/africa/nigeria-bombing-suspectsarrested.html?_r=2. (2- 8- 2012).

Government Publications

Carson, J. (2012). "Nigeria, One Year After Elections: US on Boko Haram, Democracy and Economy." A Press Release prepared for Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC. April 9, pp. 1-5.

Rotberg, R.I. (2002), Failed States in a World of Terror. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/africa/failed-states-world-terror/p4733>

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Annual Report 2012 - Countries of Particular Concern: Nigeria, 20 March 2012. Retrieved on 4 July, 2012 from <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f71a675a.html>

Walker, A. (2012), What Is Boko Haram? United States Institute of Peace Special, Report 308 June.